NFPA amends the Fuel Gas Code to prevent purging of pipelines using natural gas after Kleen explosion

Aug 11, 2010- The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), through an emergency revision to the NFPA 2009 code, has prohibited the purging of gas pipelines by using natural gas. This is a direct fallout of the Kleen Energy accident investigation, after the US Chemical Safety Board concluded that the purging by natural gas led to the accident. The CSB had also appealed to standards and regulatory bodies like OSHA and NFPA to amend the codes that regulate natural gas piping and operations in view of these findings. We had reported all about it here.

The NFPA has now responded by issuing aTentative Interim Amendment to Section 54 of the Natural Gas Code. This can be downloaded from here.
(Note: The code specifically talks about installing a gas detector to detect the presence of natural gas-if you would like to know how to specify, select, install, calibrate and maintain these gas detectors, please click here)

The CSB was glad to hear about this and the agency has issued a statement reproduced below.

Here’s the CSB statement (in Italics)

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Emergency Change to National Fuel Gas Code Addresses Cause of Fatal June 2009 Blast at ConAgra Slim Jim Plant in North Carolina

On February 4, 2010, I presided at a Chemical Safety Board public meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina, to present the CSB’s findings on the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim manufacturing plant in the nearby community of Garner.

That tragic and preventable accident cost four lives, injured 67 others, and led to a decision to close the plant, with the loss of hundreds of jobs in the region.  The accident occurred during an operation to purge (or clear air) from a new steel gas-supply pipe that was connected to a newly installed industrial water heater.  The pipe was connected at the other end to the building’s natural gas distribution system.  During the purging operation, gas was allowed to flow through the pipe and exit through an open valve inside the utility room where the water heater was located.  Due to difficulties in lighting the water heater, the purging operation was continued for an unusually long time, eventually causing gas to accumulate above the lower explosive limit inside the building.  The gas contacted an ignition source and exploded, causing extensive sections of the large facility to collapse.

The CSB noted that the accident at ConAgra was but one of a number of similar explosions caused by an intentional, planned work activity that inadvertently led to a large and unsafe release of natural gas into a workplace.

At the time of the accident, indoor purging of natural gas systems was not prohibited under the National Fuel Gas Code, a key consensus code of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) that has been adopted by many states and localities across the country.  At the February 4 public meeting, the Board voted to make urgent recommendations to NFPA and the International Code Council to prohibit indoor purging and require companies and installers to purge flammable fuel gases to safe locations outdoors, away from workers and ignition sources.

I am pleased that the NFPA made our recommendation a high priority and took immediate steps to improve the National Fuel Gas Code.  Last week, on August 5, the NFPA Standards Council gave final approval to an emergency code change, known as a Tentative Interim Amendment, that will prohibit indoor purging of industrial gas lines operating at greater than two pounds per square inch gauge (psig) or meeting certain pipe size criteria.  According to the NFPA, the new requirements are designed to require outdoor purging for industrial, large commercial, and large multifamily buildings.

These new provisions would have required the gas pipe at ConAgra to be purged outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources.  Under the new requirements, purging must be monitored using appropriate detection equipment to prevent a significant release of flammable gas.  The new requirements are similar to new safety procedures developed and implemented by both ConAgra and the State of North Carolina in the months following the tragedy.

Outdoor purging is inherently safer than venting gas into a building.  Had the gas pipe at ConAgra been safely purged outdoors, the explosion and resulting deaths and injuries could have been avoided.

I encourage all companies to study the new code recommendations and to purge flammable gases outdoors whenever possible.  I urge the NFPA to ensure that a prohibition on indoor purging and other safeguards are permanently incorporated into the National Fuel Gas Code, and I thank the NFPA leadership and members for their positive actions to promote worker safety.

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Caribbean Petroleum Corporation Tank Explosion in Puerto Rico

Nov 18 Update:  Cause of the accident found out- please click here for the detailed story.

This week seems to be the season of refinery accidents. After the Tesoro refinery fire, now we have another one, this time in Puerto Rico.

Oct 25, 2009-  A large fire that reportedly broke out in the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation’s Bayamon facility in Puerto Rico is still raging without any signs of getting under control anytime soon. More than 150 firefighters are working continuously at the scene, backed by the National Guard. News from various sources say that about 1500 people have been evacuated from their homes. Schools in the vicity are reportedly closed due to the incident.

The fire began after an explosion in the facility, that was heard for miles around. Surprisingly explosions reportedly happened in as many of 12 out of the 40 or so storage tanks at the location.

What adds a twist in the tale is the suspicion, that it may have been an act of sabotage. To investigate this aspect, sources claim that FBI agents are on the hunt for the perpetrators, who have scrawled graffiti about it  in a San Juan tunnel.

The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB for short), has also stepped in to investigate and has now deployed a six member team of investigators to travel to Puerto Rico immediately. CSB Investigator Jeff Wanko, PE, will lead the team which is expected on the island soon.

And to top it all, a lawyer has already gone ahead and filed a class action suit against Caribbean Petroleum Company in the  Federal District court in San Juan.

A huge cloud of acrid smoke, as seen in the picture below has started enveloping parts of San Juan.  However Gov. Loius Fortuno, reportedly denied to reporters that the event can be classed as an environmental disaster.

Here’s a picture of the fire that gives a perspective of it’s scope and severity.

Stay tuned for more developments on this one on this blog.

Tesoro Refinery Fire at Salt Lake City-CSB to investigate

There has been a fire at the Tesoro refinery in Salt Lake City, Utah that looks eerily similar to the infamous Texas BP fire. Despite so many incidents, apparently, safety is not being given the top priority it once was, by company managements. Or such incidents happening due to the bean counters in the higher ups in these companies? (Because these penny wise pound foolish guys seem to have virtually decimated the large engineering and operations groups that used to be present in many large companies). Today, under the guise of “cost cutting” and “operational efficiencies”, most large engineering teams have been given the heave ho. The results are there for all to see. Anybody who has worked in the 70s, 80s or even early 90s will understand what I am talking about…..

The below news is from the CSB’s website at http://www.chemsafety.gov

Washington, DC, October 22, 2009 – A three-person investigative team from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) will be examining a fire that occurred Wednesday evening at the Tesoro refinery in Salt Lake City, Utah, following a power outage earlier in the day.

According to refinery officials, liquid hydrocarbons were released from a flare stack during an effort to restart the refinery’s crude unit. The hydrocarbons were ignited in a pool fire that extended from the base of the stack and damaged a trailer and other equipment that were positioned nearby.
CSB Investigator Cheryl MacKenzie will lead the three-person team from the CSB’s Western Regional Office in Denver, Colorado. The team is expected to arrive at the site today.

CSB Chairman Bresland said the CSB inquiry would seek to determine if there are any similarities to the 2005 accident at the BP Texas City refinery, which occurred when flammable liquid erupted from a blowdown stack during a unit startup, leading to a massive vapor cloud explosion that killed 15 workers in nearby trailers and injured 180 others. The CSB recommended numerous changes to regulations, enforcement, and industry safety practices following that accident.

“Nearly four years after the disaster in Texas City, there continues to be a disturbing number of fires, explosions, and releases at the nation’s refineries. These events endanger workers and the public and can disrupt the supply of needed transportation fuels,” said Chairman John Bresland. “A sudden release of flammable liquid from a flare or blowdown stack poses a potential risk to people, equipment, and the environment and warrants a close look.”

No injuries were reported in the fire at Tesoro, but smoke and flames were visible over a wide area in Salt Lake City, and an interstate highway and a commuter rail line were closed temporarily. Refinery and municipal firefighters extinguished the blaze within an hour.

The CSB continues to investigate the serious flash fire that occurred in January 2009 at the Silver Eagle refinery in nearby Woods Cross, Utah, with a final report expected early in 2010.