NFPA amends the Fuel Gas Code to prevent purging of pipelines using natural gas after Kleen explosion
Aug 11, 2010- The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), through an emergency revision to the NFPA 2009 code, has prohibited the purging of gas pipelines by using natural gas. This is a direct fallout of the Kleen Energy accident investigation, after the US Chemical Safety Board concluded that the purging by natural gas led to the accident. The CSB had also appealed to standards and regulatory bodies like OSHA and NFPA to amend the codes that regulate natural gas piping and operations in view of these findings. We had reported all about it here.
The NFPA has now responded by issuing aTentative Interim Amendment to Section 54 of the Natural Gas Code. This can be downloaded from here.
(Note: The code specifically talks about installing a gas detector to detect the presence of natural gas-if you would like to know how to specify, select, install, calibrate and maintain these gas detectors, please click here)
The CSB was glad to hear about this and the agency has issued a statement reproduced below.
Here’s the CSB statement (in Italics)
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Emergency Change to National Fuel Gas Code Addresses Cause of Fatal June 2009 Blast at ConAgra Slim Jim Plant in North Carolina
On February 4, 2010, I presided at a Chemical Safety Board public meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina, to present the CSB’s findings on the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim manufacturing plant in the nearby community of Garner.
That tragic and preventable accident cost four lives, injured 67 others, and led to a decision to close the plant, with the loss of hundreds of jobs in the region. The accident occurred during an operation to purge (or clear air) from a new steel gas-supply pipe that was connected to a newly installed industrial water heater. The pipe was connected at the other end to the building’s natural gas distribution system. During the purging operation, gas was allowed to flow through the pipe and exit through an open valve inside the utility room where the water heater was located. Due to difficulties in lighting the water heater, the purging operation was continued for an unusually long time, eventually causing gas to accumulate above the lower explosive limit inside the building. The gas contacted an ignition source and exploded, causing extensive sections of the large facility to collapse.
The CSB noted that the accident at ConAgra was but one of a number of similar explosions caused by an intentional, planned work activity that inadvertently led to a large and unsafe release of natural gas into a workplace.
At the time of the accident, indoor purging of natural gas systems was not prohibited under the National Fuel Gas Code, a key consensus code of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) that has been adopted by many states and localities across the country. At the February 4 public meeting, the Board voted to make urgent recommendations to NFPA and the International Code Council to prohibit indoor purging and require companies and installers to purge flammable fuel gases to safe locations outdoors, away from workers and ignition sources.
I am pleased that the NFPA made our recommendation a high priority and took immediate steps to improve the National Fuel Gas Code. Last week, on August 5, the NFPA Standards Council gave final approval to an emergency code change, known as a Tentative Interim Amendment, that will prohibit indoor purging of industrial gas lines operating at greater than two pounds per square inch gauge (psig) or meeting certain pipe size criteria. According to the NFPA, the new requirements are designed to require outdoor purging for industrial, large commercial, and large multifamily buildings.
These new provisions would have required the gas pipe at ConAgra to be purged outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources. Under the new requirements, purging must be monitored using appropriate detection equipment to prevent a significant release of flammable gas. The new requirements are similar to new safety procedures developed and implemented by both ConAgra and the State of North Carolina in the months following the tragedy.
Outdoor purging is inherently safer than venting gas into a building. Had the gas pipe at ConAgra been safely purged outdoors, the explosion and resulting deaths and injuries could have been avoided.
I encourage all companies to study the new code recommendations and to purge flammable gases outdoors whenever possible. I urge the NFPA to ensure that a prohibition on indoor purging and other safeguards are permanently incorporated into the National Fuel Gas Code, and I thank the NFPA leadership and members for their positive actions to promote worker safety.
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Kleen Energy Explosion impact-CSB urges OSHA to ban gas purging of pipelines
Aug 05, 2010-The Chemical Safety Board has now recommended OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) to ban purging of pipelines with natural gas, that can cause explosions. This should have been done a long time back, but it was only after the Kleen Energy explosion that things started moving in this direction.
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This is rather surprising for evrybody in the chemicals, petrochemicals and oil industries who have operated boilers, fired heaters, etc are aware that before starting any burner, some purging is to be done with air, to drive away residual gas in the burning chamber to prevent explosions and back firing. However it is surprining that in many natural gas processing facilities instead of using Nitrogen or compressed air for purging, they use the natural gas itself. This in itself may not be entirely unsafe IF and this is a BIG IF that the surroundings are free of ignition sources of any kind and the gas can quickly dilute below its % LEL (lower explosive limit). However in the Kleen energy kind of situation where there was large scale welding and cutting going on, with plenty of sparks flying around, it is surprising that the regular venting of natural gas purging resulted in just one explosion…theoretically it should have resulted in many!
There is an urgent need for people to understand the principles of explosion protection, classified areas, hazardous area classification, gas monitoring and other such concepts to prevent Kleen energy like incidents.
Anyways, here’s what the CSB now says (reproduced from their website)
Statement of CSB Chairperson Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso Urges OSHA to Adopt CSB Recommendation Prohibiting Flammable Gas Blows During Pipe Cleaning Operations
On June 28, 2010, at a public meeting in Portland, Connecticut, the Chemical Safety Board voted to issue 18 urgent recommendations to various recipients, including OSHA, aimed at halting the dangerous practice of releasing large quantities of flammable gas in the presence of workers and ignition sources during cleaning operations.
Six workers were killed and there were numerous injuries on February 7, 2010, at the Kleen Energy power plant under construction in Middletown, Connecticut.
A recommendation to OSHA called for, among other things, the promulgation of regulations to prohibit the release of flammable gas to the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning fuel gas piping.
Today, OSHA announced citations and proposed fines against construction companies and contractors at the Kleen Energy power plant construction site and announced a plan to notify natural gas power plant operators of the dangers of natural gas blows.
I was pleased that during his news conference, Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for OSHA, stated his agency is studying the CSB recommendation to prohibit flammable gas releases during cleaning operations, and that OSHA agrees with the CSB that this problem must be addressed immediately.
Dr. Michaels stated that OSHA likely does not have the authority to prohibit the use of flammable gases during pipe cleaning operations, and that promulgating such a regulation would take years.
The CSB believes that OSHA does have adequate authority to take this action and to start the standard setting process at any time.
The CSB found that the practice of gas blows is inherently unsafe. In its investigation of the Kleen Energy accident, the CSB found that several safe alternatives to pipe cleaning are available to the industry are already in use, such as compressed air, nitrogen and the use of a solid cleaning device propelled by compressed air that is referred to as a pig. Furthermore, the CSB found companies have already begun to ban the practice. And at least one leading manufacturer of natural gas electric turbines, General Electric, has informed its customers it will not support the practice of gas blows to clear out pipes leading to the turbines. A GE official discussed this during the CSB public meeting held in June in Connecticut.
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Yet Another Hot Work Accident in Colorado-CSB chief expresses regret
Washington, DC, July 9, 2010 — Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso, chairperson and CEO of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) said today he was saddened by news of the death of a Colorado welder yesterday while performing what is called “hot work” on a storage tank containing flammables at an environmental remediation company in Englewood, Colorado.
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Hot work is defined as welding, cutting, grinding, or other spark-producing activities that can ignite flammable substances. To date in 2010, the CSB has learned of 15 serious hot work-related fires and explosions that caused six reported fatalities and numerous injuries.
Dr. Moure said, “I am saddened by this accident and disturbed that such fatalities continue to occur. The CSB is vitally concerned about hot work accidents and this was expressed in our important safety bulletin and safety video, both issued within the past few months.”
According to information gathered by the CSB from the fire department and the company, a worker was standing on a ladder, welding on the side of a tank partially filled with a mixture of water and flammable hydrocarbons. Sparks ignited flammable vapor and the worker was thrown off the ladder, suffering fatal injuries.
The company stated that although it has a hot work permit system and had provided safety training to the victim, there was no monitoring for a flammable atmosphere before or during the welding. ( What a joke-how can anybody issue a permit when they haven’t measured the flammable gas concentration in the area-do they expect a piece of paper will actually prevent an accident?!). While current OSHA standards prohibit hot work in an explosive atmosphere, OSHA does not explicitly require the use of combustible gas detectors.
There have been more than 60 fatalities since 1990 due to explosions and fires from hot work activities on tanks. In seven of the 11 accidents discussed in the bulletin, no gas testing was performed prior to or during the hot work activities. In the remaining cases, monitoring was conducted improperly.
Dr. Moure said, “There is no secret to preventing these accidents. Companies should require effective monitoring of the atmosphere before and during all welding or other spark-producing activities near tanks that may contain flammable liquids or gases. Monitoring should be frequent or continuous and performed at multiple locations to assure that no flammable vapor is present which could be ignited. Monitoring the atmosphere and following the other six key lessons in our bulletin can help avoid these tragedies.”
CSB approves urgent recommendations to OSHA NFPA and others to prevent Kleen energy type natural gas explosions
For hazardous area training and gas monitor training, please click here.
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June 28, 2010 Middletown, CT On a 4-1 vote, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board tonight approved urgent safety recommendations to OSHA, NFPA and others. The draft recommendations, which were approved without amendments at a public meeting in Portland, CT, aim to prevent deadly explosions and fires during pipe cleaning and purging operations.
The recommendations – directed to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and others, result from extensive CSB investigations into the February 7, 2010, explosion at the Kleen Energy power plant in Middletown that caused six deaths and multiple injuries, and the June 9, 2009, explosion at the ConAgra Foods Slim Jim plant in Garner, North Carolina, that killed four workers and injured 67.
The accident at Kleen Energy occurred during the planned cleaning of natural gas piping during the commissioning and startup phase of construction. Natural gas was forced through large piping that was to fuel the plant’s large electricity-generating gas turbines, in an operation called a “natural gas blow.” This gas was vented directly to the atmosphere from open pipe ends that were less than 20 feet off the ground and were located in congested areas adjacent to the power generation building.
CSB investigators obtained gas company records showing some two million standard cubic feet of natural gas were released to the atmosphere during gas blows on February 7—enough, the CSB calculated, to provide heating and cooking fuel to a typical American home every day for more than 25 years!! The gas found an ignition source and exploded.
In the CSB proposed recommendations, OSHA is urged to pass regulations that would prohibit the use of natural gas for pipe cleaning, the cause of the explosion at Kleen Energy, and would prohibit the venting or purging of fuel gas indoors, the cause of the explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant. Both explosions resulted from releases of natural gas during the installation and commissioning of new piping that led to gas-fired appliances.
OSHA is also urged to require that companies involve their workers and contractors in developing safe procedures and training for handling fuel gas.
In testimony this morning at a field hearing before a subcommittee of the U.S House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor, held in Middletown, CSB Board Member John Bresland said there is a “significant gap” in the current gas safety standards for general industry and construction, “a gap that threatens the continued safety of workers at facilities that handle flammable natural gas.”
An urgent recommendation directed at the NFPA urges the code-development organization to enact a tentative interim amendment as well as permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code that addresses the safe conduct of fuel gas piping cleaning operations. Under the draft recommendation, NFPA would be asked to remove key exemptions in the code for natural gas power plants and for high-pressure gas piping and to require the use of inherently safer alternatives to natural gas blows. CSB investigators determined that compressed air is a feasible and economical alternative to using natural gas for pipe cleaning and is already used by many companies.
Mr. Bresland told the House Committee, “At our CSB public meeting later this evening, I intend to vote for and support new urgent safety recommendations that we have developed, calling for OSHA to enact new regulations to control this hazard, and I will encourage the other Board members to do the same.”
Other draft recommendations would seek related safety improvements from the State of Connecticut and other states, the leading gas turbine manufacturers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the Electric Power Research Institute.
At the public meeting, newly appointed CSB Chairman Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso will preside; Dr. Moure and Mr. Mark Griffon were confirmed by the Senate on Wednesday June 23 and were commissioned by President Obama the following day.
The CSB public meeting begins at 6:30 p.m. at the Saint Clements Castle conference facility, 1931 Portland-Cobalt Road, Portland, Connecticut, (860) 342-0593. The public is invited; no prior arrangements are needed. Attendance is free and there will be ample seating and free parking.
The CSB investigation team, headed by Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom, will present a report on the Kleen Energy accident as well as a review of existing regulations applying to the practice of gas blows at power plants and general industry.
The Board will hear from two witness panels, including –
· Professor Paul Amyotte – Dalhousie University (Canada)
· Ervin Patterson – Commissioning Management Services, Inc.
· Larry Danner – GE Energy
· Representative Matthew Lesser – Connecticut House of Representatives
· Professor Glenn Corbett – John Jay College of Criminal Justice (New York)
· Michael Rosario – Local 777, United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters
· Steven Schrag – Connecticut Council for Occupational Safety and Health
Following a public comment period in which any interested person may speak, the Board will vote on the recommendations. The CSB staff is expected to propose (subject to Board approval) that upon passage of the urgent recommendations, the Kleen Energy and ConAgra investigations would be concluded. Although no additional written report is planned beyond the statement of more than 60 factual findings, the CSB plans to develop a computer-animated safety video describing the two accidents and the recommendations for safety change.
Mr. Bresland told the House committee, “We believe that the 18 urgent recommendations proposed today – together with the two urgent recommendations we issued on February 4 – address all of the principal root causes of these two tragic accidents. If adopted by the recipients, I have no doubt that future accidents will be avoided and lives will be saved as a result.”
OSHA fines BP- Husky refinery more than $ 3 million
OREGON, Ohio — The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration has cited BP North American Inc. and BP-Husky Refining LLC’s refinery in Oregon, Ohio, with 42 alleged willful violations, including 39 on a per-instance basis, and 20 alleged serious violations for exposing workers to a variety of hazards including failure to provide adequate pressure relief for process units. Proposed penalties total $3,042,000.
“OSHA has found that BP often ignored or severely delayed fixing known hazards in its refineries,” said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. “There is no excuse for taking chances with people’s lives. BP must fix the hazards now.”
OSHA began its inspection at the refinery located near Toledo, Ohio, in September 2009 as part of the agency’s Refinery National Emphasis Program and as a follow-up to a 2006 inspection and a 2007 settlement agreement between OSHA and BP at this location. Although the 2009 inspection found that BP had complied with the settlement agreement, OSHA found numerous violations at the plant not previously covered by the agreement.
The inspection revealed that workers were exposed to serious injury and death in the event of a release of flammable and explosive materials in the refinery because of numerous conditions constituting violations of OSHA’s process safety management standard. OSHA has issued willful citations for numerous failures to provide adequate pressure relief for process units, failures to provide safeguards to prevent the hazardous accumulation of fuel in process heaters, and exposing workers to injury and death from collapse of or damage, in the event of a fire, to nine buildings in the refinery. Additional willful citations allege various other violations of OSHA’s standard addressing process safety management. These citations carry proposed penalties totaling $2,940,000.
The serious citations address a variety of other hazards, including violations of other requirements of the process safety management standard. These carry proposed penalties totaling $102,000.
Since 1991, this refinery has been inspected 12 times. Nationally, BP Products North American has been inspected by OSHA 44 times at various sites and is facing pending cases in which 439 willful citations and failure-to-abate notices were issued to its Texas City Refinery as a result of a 2009 inspection. Proposed penalties in those pending cases total $87 million, the largest penalties by far ever proposed by OSHA. BP’s Texas City Refinery experienced a devastating explosion and fire in 2005 that killed 15 workers and injured 170. A large portion of the penalties proposed for the Texas City Refinery results from OSHA’s allegations that BP failed to fully live up to a settlement agreement entered into after the explosion. BP has contested the citations, notifications of failure-to-abate and the proposed penalties in those cases.
BP North American Inc. operates and jointly owns the refinery with Canadian-based Husky Energy Inc. The company has 15 business days from receipt of the citations to comply, request an information conference with the OSHA area director or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces for their employees. OSHA’s role is to assure these conditions for America’s working men and women by setting and enforcing standards, and providing training, education and assistance.
For more information, visit http://www.osha.gov.
