Offshore Oil and Gas Regulation-CSB to hold hearing
CSB to Hold Hearing in Washington DC to Hear Expert Testimony on Regulation of Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Practices
Washington, DC, November 23, 2010 – The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today announced that it will be holding a daylong public hearing entitled “Regulatory Approaches to Offshore Oil and Gas Safety” on Wednesday, December 15, 2010, in Washington DC. The meeting is part of the CSB’s ongoing investigation into the April 20, 2010, fire and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon that killed 11 workers. The hearing will bring together international regulators, union representatives and industry groups to discuss approaches to regulating the safety of offshore oil and gas exploration and production.
The meeting will be held from 8:30 am – 4:30 pm at the Embassy Suites Ballroom located at 1250 22nd Street Northwest in Washington D.C. The meeting is free and open to the public.
The CSB’s board members and Deepwater Horizon investigation team will hear testimony from leading safety experts involved in offshore drilling activities from the United Kingdom, Australia and Norway. Members of the audience will have an opportunity to comment and to submit questions for the panel participants.
The meeting will be available via webcast. All proceedings will be videotaped and an official transcript will be published.
BP releases investigation report into Deepwater Horizon accident
Sep 09, 2010- BP released their own internal investigation report yesterday into the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion, fire, sinking and then massive oil spill caused by the rupturing of the pipeline riser several thousand meters below the ocean surface of the Macondo well. However, there is no one cause that has been listed, but rather several contributing causes have been mentioned. Some of the key noteworthy points in the report are listed below.
Our own comments are highlighted below (in bold italics).
1. Weaknesses in cement design and testing.
2. Failure of the shoe-track barrier in isolating hydrocarbons. The investigation team has reportedly found some clues that identify how the shoetrack cement and the float collar allowed hydrocarbon ingress into the production casing.
3. Acceptance of the negative pressure test before establishing the well integrity-here BP has pointed fingers at the Transocean rig crew as well as at BP’s own rig leadership which “incorrectly” interpreted the test results.
4. Influx was not recognized until the hydrocarbons were in the riser.Apparently almost 40 minutes before the crew started taking action, increase in drill pipe pressure data could be seen-which was not apparently noticed.
5. Wrong actions on diverting the fluids exiting the riser to the Mud-Gas separator, rather than to the overboard diverter line.
6. Once diverted to the Mud-Gas Separator, the fluids got vented onto the rig itself, where it these fluids may have found an ignition source and exploded
7. Failure of the Fire & Gas System to prevent ignition-this point seems a bit debatable, because an F & G system cannot “prevent” a fire from occuring really- all it does it to measure any gas leaks or fires and extinguish them. Apparently the hydrocarbons went into unclassified areas like engine rooms where it could find potential sources of ignition.
Incidentally this is a similar phenomenon that was observed in the infamous Buncefield, UK accident where a large explosion took place.
8. Lastly the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) did not seal the well. The control pods that were supposed to act did not work, a guess is that they got damaged due to the fire and explosion. Consequently a critical solenoid operated valve did not operate. What is more startling and damning however, is that the control pod batteries had inadequate charging, due to which the Solenoid valve did not operate-this is most certainly an oversight by the maintenance personnel who were in charge of the Control & Instrumentation systems on the rig.
Finally the report mentioned that the investigation revealed potential weaknesses in the inspection and maintenance regimes.
Though there will be several more investigation reports from different agencies like the Coast Guard, the US Chemical Safety Board and others, the initial BP investigation does seem to have covered a lot of ground. It raises questions about hazardous area classification, especially on an oil rig where the classification of areas that are classified and “safe” or “non-hazardous” seems a bit arbitrary. If one cannot know which areas of the rig would have the presence of hydrocarbons then there is no point in classifying-one should designate all areas as hazardous, although with different risk profiles such as Zone 1, Zone 2 and so on.
We’re sure this is not the last that would be written on this subject, but it gives a good idea of the importance of two subjects-hazardous area classification and gas monitors
Have a look at the excellent training resources for both of these crucial topics here.
Another Gulf Oil Rig Explosion-Mariner Energy rig accident
Sep 3, 2010 Houma, La — Yet another accident at an Oil Rig in the Gulf of Mexico! An oil rig operated by Mariner Energy Inc in shallow water suffered an explosion. About 13 workers had to jump into the sea, from where they were later rescued. No casualties have been reported. This comes as a bad news to the Oil & Gas industry, which is already battling a mortarium on deepwater drilling in the gulf. Now that this latest accident has taken place in shallow waters raises a lot of question marks over the safety of operations in ALL offshore places, shallow or deep. AS of now no oil spill has been reported, but its too early to say.
Recall that when the first reports of the Deepwater Horizon explosion started coming in the spillage reported was “only a few hundred barrels” and slowly it emerged that hundreds of thousands of barrels may have been spilled. Lets cross our fingers and watch this one.
CSB finally agrees to investigate root causes of the BP Transocean Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig and oil spill disaster
22nd June, 2010 -Finally, acceding to requests from members of the public and their elected representatives, the US Chemical Safety Board, has agreed to investigate in depth (pun not intended), the circumstances that led to the explosion and sinking of BP’s Transocean Deepwater Horizon and consequent oil spill that has become a national disaster, worse than Hurricane Katrina or the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The fact that the CSB is likely to investigate this accident was already reported on this blog, if you remember.
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For comprehensive and easy to understand training courses on Hazardous Area Instrumentation, Gas Detection and Safety Instrumented Systems (including SIL training) please click here.
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Here is the full text of the letter written by Chairman John Bresland of the CSB to Hon. Henry Waxman and Hon. Bart Stupak , both of the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Dear Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak:
I write in response to your letter of June 8, 2010, requesting a CSB investigation of the causes of the BP/Transocean rig explosion that occurred on April 20, 2010. We recognize that this human and ecological disaster is one of the most significant chemical accidents of the current era. We also agree, as noted in your letter, that the CSB’s past work on BP’s safety culture and corporate safety oversight places us in a unique role to understand important aspects of this tragedy. In addition, as we stated to you in our letter of May 7 we are of the opinion that we have the legal authority to investigate this accident. All of us share your hope that every possible lesson will be learned from this accident so that nothing similar ever occurs again.
For all these reasons, the CSB intends to proceed with an investigation of the root causes of the accidental chemical release that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon rig and took the lives of 11 workers. The investigation will include the key investigators who were involved in the CSB’s 2005-2007 investigation of the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery. We intend to prioritize this work and to apply all of our available resources to ensure the best possible investigation.
Although we will be vigilant for any similarities to the Texas City explosion, as suggested in your letter, we believe it is also important that this investigation be approached without any preconceptions and that all possible underlying factors and causes are thoroughly
and objectively examined. Like other CSB investigations, the investigation should include an examination of key technical factors, the safety cultures involved, and the effectiveness of relevant laws, regulations, and industry standards. We further note that there are numerous other investigations of the April 20 accident that have either been announced or are underway, including those of your own committee, various federal regulatory agencies, and the presidential oil spill commission. To the extent possible, we will seek to coordinate and to avoid duplication of effort with those important activities, without compromising our statutory independence.
We would particularly welcome the Committee’s assistance in promoting cooperation with the other investigations that are currently underway, including help with obtaining relevant documents already collected from companies or other parties or otherwise in the possession of federal regulatory agencies. Additionally, we would appreciate the Committee’s help in ensuring the integrity and independence of the CSB investigation, as distinct from any criminal inquiries that may occur. Although we have the highest respect for those inquiries, it is important that law enforcement investigators collect information directly from the parties involved and not via the CSB investigative process, which requires an open exchange of information between key witnesses and our civilian safety investigators.
The CSB plans to focus on events prior to and including the explosion on April 20; we believe that an examination of the response to the disaster and the impact of the ongoing massive oil spill is beyond the CSB’s current resources and abilities.
To conduct this work, the Board will have to make some difficult choices and decisions. As you know, the CSB had a record-high caseload even before this disaster occurred. We already have a higher number of open investigations than we have actual investigators on staff. Accordingly, to investigate the rig disaster, we anticipate that certain extraordinary measures will be required, including:
Bringing certain ongoing investigations to a very rapid conclusion, including investigations of the major explosions at the Kleen Energy power plant (Middletown, CT) and the ConAgra Slim Jim facility (Garner, NC) Terminating certain smaller investigations and placing other investigations on hold pending a further definition of the scope for the BP/Transocean investigation Temporarily reassigning personnel within the agency to support the new investigation Subject to existing Congressional and OMB notification requirements, drawing upon the Board’s $847,000 emergency investigative fund to put in place appropriate contracts and experts as rapidly as possible Requesting supplemental funding, as needed, to ensure a thorough and complete investigation. We note that the total cost of the CSB’s prior investigation on BP Texas City was approximately $2.5 million. However, the new BP/Transocean investigation presents in many respects an even higher level of cost and complexity.
We thank you and the Committee for your recognition of the importance of our safety investigations and for your longstanding support of our mission.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
John S. Bresland
Chairman
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant leak-complete shutdown averted
For an excellent e-learning course on Emergency Shutdown Systems and Safety Instrumented Systems, please click here.
June 16, 2010- The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power plant, operated by Entergy, reportedly had a near emergency shutdown recently when a cooling water valve started leaking heavily. The leak was of the order of 1.6 gallons of radioactive water per minute (far above the “legally allowable” limit of 1 gallon per minute). However regulatory officials and the plant management claimed that there was no immediate danger.
The maintenance team replaced the faulty valve within about five hours after the incident. If they had been unsuccessful, probably the plant would have had to do an emergency shutdown as per the rules. Local sources said that the 38 year old plant was prone to “many leaks” in the recent past, but these reports could not be independently verified. The latest incident underscores however that the public belief that nuclear energy is “far better” than fossil fuel based energy (after the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill) is not correct. Nuclear power plants also have their risks, although the proper engineering and management of the safety systems can mitigate these risks to a large extent. This was also thought before the BP Oil Spill about offshore drilling….now of course we know how that went awry.
