CSB approves urgent recommendations to OSHA NFPA and others to prevent Kleen energy type natural gas explosions
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June 28, 2010 Middletown, CT On a 4-1 vote, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board tonight approved urgent safety recommendations to OSHA, NFPA and others. The draft recommendations, which were approved without amendments at a public meeting in Portland, CT, aim to prevent deadly explosions and fires during pipe cleaning and purging operations.
The recommendations – directed to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and others, result from extensive CSB investigations into the February 7, 2010, explosion at the Kleen Energy power plant in Middletown that caused six deaths and multiple injuries, and the June 9, 2009, explosion at the ConAgra Foods Slim Jim plant in Garner, North Carolina, that killed four workers and injured 67.
The accident at Kleen Energy occurred during the planned cleaning of natural gas piping during the commissioning and startup phase of construction. Natural gas was forced through large piping that was to fuel the plant’s large electricity-generating gas turbines, in an operation called a “natural gas blow.” This gas was vented directly to the atmosphere from open pipe ends that were less than 20 feet off the ground and were located in congested areas adjacent to the power generation building.
CSB investigators obtained gas company records showing some two million standard cubic feet of natural gas were released to the atmosphere during gas blows on February 7—enough, the CSB calculated, to provide heating and cooking fuel to a typical American home every day for more than 25 years!! The gas found an ignition source and exploded.
In the CSB proposed recommendations, OSHA is urged to pass regulations that would prohibit the use of natural gas for pipe cleaning, the cause of the explosion at Kleen Energy, and would prohibit the venting or purging of fuel gas indoors, the cause of the explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant. Both explosions resulted from releases of natural gas during the installation and commissioning of new piping that led to gas-fired appliances.
OSHA is also urged to require that companies involve their workers and contractors in developing safe procedures and training for handling fuel gas.
In testimony this morning at a field hearing before a subcommittee of the U.S House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor, held in Middletown, CSB Board Member John Bresland said there is a “significant gap” in the current gas safety standards for general industry and construction, “a gap that threatens the continued safety of workers at facilities that handle flammable natural gas.”
An urgent recommendation directed at the NFPA urges the code-development organization to enact a tentative interim amendment as well as permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code that addresses the safe conduct of fuel gas piping cleaning operations. Under the draft recommendation, NFPA would be asked to remove key exemptions in the code for natural gas power plants and for high-pressure gas piping and to require the use of inherently safer alternatives to natural gas blows. CSB investigators determined that compressed air is a feasible and economical alternative to using natural gas for pipe cleaning and is already used by many companies.
Mr. Bresland told the House Committee, “At our CSB public meeting later this evening, I intend to vote for and support new urgent safety recommendations that we have developed, calling for OSHA to enact new regulations to control this hazard, and I will encourage the other Board members to do the same.”
Other draft recommendations would seek related safety improvements from the State of Connecticut and other states, the leading gas turbine manufacturers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the Electric Power Research Institute.
At the public meeting, newly appointed CSB Chairman Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso will preside; Dr. Moure and Mr. Mark Griffon were confirmed by the Senate on Wednesday June 23 and were commissioned by President Obama the following day.
The CSB public meeting begins at 6:30 p.m. at the Saint Clements Castle conference facility, 1931 Portland-Cobalt Road, Portland, Connecticut, (860) 342-0593. The public is invited; no prior arrangements are needed. Attendance is free and there will be ample seating and free parking.
The CSB investigation team, headed by Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom, will present a report on the Kleen Energy accident as well as a review of existing regulations applying to the practice of gas blows at power plants and general industry.
The Board will hear from two witness panels, including –
· Professor Paul Amyotte – Dalhousie University (Canada)
· Ervin Patterson – Commissioning Management Services, Inc.
· Larry Danner – GE Energy
· Representative Matthew Lesser – Connecticut House of Representatives
· Professor Glenn Corbett – John Jay College of Criminal Justice (New York)
· Michael Rosario – Local 777, United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters
· Steven Schrag – Connecticut Council for Occupational Safety and Health
Following a public comment period in which any interested person may speak, the Board will vote on the recommendations. The CSB staff is expected to propose (subject to Board approval) that upon passage of the urgent recommendations, the Kleen Energy and ConAgra investigations would be concluded. Although no additional written report is planned beyond the statement of more than 60 factual findings, the CSB plans to develop a computer-animated safety video describing the two accidents and the recommendations for safety change.
Mr. Bresland told the House committee, “We believe that the 18 urgent recommendations proposed today – together with the two urgent recommendations we issued on February 4 – address all of the principal root causes of these two tragic accidents. If adopted by the recipients, I have no doubt that future accidents will be avoided and lives will be saved as a result.”
Oklahama Oil Site Explosion-CSB releases report
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Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 23, 2010 — A fiery explosion that took the life of a 21-year-old member of the public in Weeletka, Oklahoma, on April 14 occurred at an unattended oil and gas production site that was unsecured and likely lacked fire or explosion warning signs, CSB investigators have determined following a four-day field assessment. Investigators arrived in Weleetka on Sunday evening and have been examining the site, conducting witness interviews, and gathering other View of tanks involved in the April 14, 2010, explosion and fireinformation throughout the week.
The accident occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m., while six individuals aged 18 to 32 were socializing at the rural site, which was normally unmanned. The site, which had four petroleum storage tanks and two brine storage tanks, was operated on private land by two production firms, Three MG Family Inc. and Enterprise Energy, who leased the mineral rights. A third company, ScissorTail Energy, operated a gas metering and collection system connected to the production equipment.
The blast occurred about 10 minutes after the group arrived at the site. Witnesses stated that they were drawn to the site when they saw the open gate while driving along a public roadway. Witnesses further stated that oil sites were a common gathering place for local residents and that they were largely unfamiliar with the hazards.
Based on witness interviews, CSB investigators determined that a lit cigarette or lighter was the likely ignition source for the explosion, which happened as the 21-year-old male who later died was peering into the hatch on top of one of the tanks. That tank contained what was later described as approximately 160 barrels of light crude oil. The resulting explosion and fire engulfed the victim and caused a second explosion in an interconnected tank. The victim suffered third-degree burns over 85% of his body. He was able to describe the accident to emergency response and ambulance personnel, but died the following morning at a Tulsa burn unit. Another individual suffered second-degree burns. A fire burned for more than three hours at the site until it could be extinguished by several responding fire departments using foam.
“The catwalk leading to the top of the tank was unsecured and readily accessible,” said CSB Investigator Vidisha Parasram. “The tank hatches had no mechanism which would permit them to be secured or locked. No fire or explosion warning signs or other warning signage was visible anywhere on the site following the accident.” Ms. Parasram said the CSB would continue to study whether any signage could have been destroyed in the fire, but that even the undamaged portions of the facility and the entrance gates had no posted warnings. Eyewitnesses said they saw no signs on the night of the accident or during previous visits to the site.
The site entrance was protected only by an unmarked gate which multiple witnesses described as being wide open on the night of April 14, and generally open and unlocked at other times. Apart from the gate the site had no fencing or other protective measures that would keep members of the public safe from hazards on the site.
“Following this accident, our investigative team was able to observe a number of other oil and gas production sites in the area. The vast majority were unsecured and had no warning signs,” said CSB Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom, who leads the CSB regional office in Denver. “Oil and gas sites that lack security measures and warning signs are an accident waiting to happen.” State officials told the CSB that Oklahoma has approximately 257,000 active and unplugged oil and gas production sites; Oklahoma requires fencing and warning signs only at sites that have toxic hydrogen sulfide gas hazards, according to state officials.
The deadly blast occurred one day after the release of a new CSB safety video at a public meeting in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The safety video, “No Place to Hang Out,” is aimed at educating young people on the hazards of socializing at oil sites, a common practice in rural areas, the CSB found. The video tells the story of the tragic deaths of 18-year-old Wade White and 16-year-old Devon Byrd, killed October 31, 2009, when an oil tank, located in a clearing in the woods near the home of one of the boys in the rural town of Carnes, suddenly exploded while the two were hanging out at the site.
A CSB preliminary analysis released on April 13 showed that 24 similar explosions and fires occurred at oil and gas production sites between 1983 and 2009. Those accidents resulted in 42 fatalities and a number of injuries; all the fatalities occurred among teenagers and young adults under the age of 25. In most cases, the explosions were ignited by a cigarette, match, or lighter. The CSB found no specific federal standards or industry guidance for security or public protection measures at oil and gas production sites. Certain states including Ohio and Colorado require fencing and other public safety measures at sites in urban areas. Ohio requires tank hatches to be sealed and locked at unattended oil sites.
Counting the accident on April 14, the CSB has thus far identified a total of seven oil site explosions and fires in Oklahoma since 1990 that killed or injured members of the public, the highest total for any state. Four of these accidents caused multiple fatalities.
CSB Board Member William Wark said, “The CSB is concerned about these ongoing accidents across the country that are needlessly taking the lives of young people. To me, it is self-evident that hazardous oil and gas sites should be secured against unauthorized entry and posted with extensive and specific warning signs. And we need to educate teenagers and young adults to stay away from these sites – they are dangerous.” Mr. Wark said the CSB team received outstanding cooperation from local law enforcement and fire officials during the investigation.
The day prior to the explosion in Weleetka, the CSB Board issued a statement “urging oil and gas production companies to ensure that they provide adequate security and warning signage around sites that have tank fire or explosion hazards; and further urging state legislatures, local governments, and regulators to review rules governing oil and gas tank sites to ensure they require adequate barriers, security measures, and warning signs.” Mr. Wark said a CSB task group will be working over the next several months to develop additional specific safety recommendations, incorporating the findings from the recent accidents in Mississippi and Oklahoma.
Tesoro Anacortes refinery fire-CSB starts investigations
Update on the Tesoro refinery fire that resulted in three fatalities and several injuries
Washington DC, April 2, 2010 -A four-member investigative team from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is deploying to the scene of an explosion and fire overnight in a naphtha hydrotreater unit at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington.
Three workers were reported to be killed and four were hospitalized for burns.
Currently, the board is investigating an October 2009 flash fire at a Tesoro Refinery in Salt Lake City, Utah, that occurred when flammable liquid overfilled a flare stack and ignited.
CSB Chairman and CEO John Bresland said, “The CSB has eighteen ongoing investigations. Of those, seven of these accidents occurred at refineries across the country. This is a significant and disturbing trend that the refining industry needs to address immediately.”
The team will be led by CSB Investigatons Supervisor Robert Hall, PE. Board Member William B. Wark will accompany the team.
Chairman Bresland said the large-scale deployment to Washington State will further complicate efforts to complete other important cases, including the CSB’s investigations of the Caribbean Petroleum fuel terminal fire near San Juan, Puerto Rico; the CITGO refinery hydrogen fluoride release and fire in Corpus Christi, Texas; the Goodyear heat exchanger rupture and ammonia release in Houston, Texas; and the Exxon Mobil refinery hydrogen fluoride release in Joliet, Illinois.
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Tesoro Refinery Fire causes fatalities
Update: View the latest update on this incident here.
Anacortes,WA April 1, 2010- Yet another explosion and fire at a Tesoro refinery, this time in Washington State. The company is already under investigation by the Chemical Safety Board for a previous fire in one of its refineries in Salt Lake City.
An explosion and fire at about 12:30 hours was reported at the Anacortes oil refinery of Tesoro that caused three fatalities and four injuries. The injured are being treated at a Seattle hospital.Residents in the areas near the refinery reported the fire and explosion to local TV stations, who then broke the story. Reports say that the refinery was undergoing routine maintenance of a Naptha unit when the explosion and fire occured.
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Here is a video of the event
The Tesoro Anacortes refinery fire is the deadliest accident involving production at a U.S. refinery since the BP Texas City explosion on March 23, 2005 in which 15 workers were killed and 180 others injured.
In the past many accidents have taken place in many refinery and petrochemical complexes during maintenance work, that has been reported not only in this blog but at many other news sources. This emphasizes that additional care has to be taken by facilities that are undergoing maintenance activities.
Cause of Caribbean Petroleum Tank Farm Fire was faulty level indications says CSB
Here’s an update on the the Caribbean Tank Farm Fire from the CSB (US Chemical Safety Board).
Bayamon, PR, November 17, 2009 – The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today announced that it will be conducting a full investigation of the October 23, 2009 explosion and fire at Caribbean Petroleum Refining. CSB investigators continue to examine the events and circumstances surrounding the catastrophic tank explosion and fire.
At 12:23 a.m. on October 23, a large vapor cloud ignited at the Caribbean Petroleum facility near San Juan, Puerto Rico. The blast damaged homes and businesses over a mile from the facility. Investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board arrived in Puerto Rico that evening. Over the past few weeks the five-person investigation team has conducted numerous interviews, requested hundreds of pages of documents and catalogued key pieces of evidence.
CSB Board Member William Wright said, “The CSB will conduct a thorough and comprehensive investigation of this accident; our team will uncover exactly what events led to an explosion of this magnitude. Our goal is to determine not only what happened, but why it happened.”
At the time of the incident a tank was being filled with gasoline from a ship docked in San Juan harbor. Investigators have determined that a likely scenario leading to the release was an accidental overfilling of the tank. Gasoline spilled from the tank without detection; as the material spilled it vaporized and spread across the facility. CSB investigators estimate that the vapor cloud spread to a 2000 foot diameter until it reached an ignition source in the northwest section of the facility.
The CSB found that on the evening of the incident, the liquid level in the tank could not be determined because the facility’s computerized level monitoring system was not fully operational. In order to monitor the level in the tank, operators used a mechanical gauge on the tank’s exterior wall. Therefore as the gasoline , employees located in the facility’s control room were unaware of the emergency.
“The filling of a tank without a functioning monitoring system is the type of activity the CSB will be examining very closely,” said Investigator-in-Charge Jeffrey Wanko, P.E. CSP. “The CSB’s investigation will examine operations particular to Caribbean Petroleum, but will also look at the regulations and best practices surrounding the industry as a whole in an effort to improve safety practices at similar facilities.”
So once again the same old story about poor level monitoring and overfill protection systems continues….the last such level monitoring failure was at Buncefield in the UK, where a malfunctioning level indicator caused overfilling and a massive explosion and fire. (Read more about it on this bog by typing Buncefield in the Search box)
On a side note: To prevent accidents and such undesirable events, it is not only essential that your plant or facility have the necessary instruments and systems, but also your staff needs to have training in how to use them. An example would be the excellent training course on hazardous area instrumentation here and another one on gas monitors here.
