Was poor area classification to blame for explosion at Veolia ES Technical Solutions Hazardous Waste Facility?
July 21, 2010, Washington DC- The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has come out with its investigation report on the 2009 explosion and fire at the Veolia ES Technical Solutions L.L.C. facility in West Carrollton, Ohio. It calls on the waste management industry the industry to improve safety standards covering
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hazardous waste processing, handling, and storage facilities. The Board also recommended that fire protection codes be revised to require companies to determine safe distances between occupied buildings and potentially hazardous areas.
This is because in the accident, flammable and explosive vapors of a solvent Tetrahydrafuran (THF) leaked and traveled some distance away from the processing area to an area that apparently was not classified as a hazardous area. These flammable vapors found anignition source and exploded, devastating the facility and the neighborhood too.
Read the entire report here (given below).
The accident occurred on May 4, 2009, when flammable vapor was released from a waste recycling process, ignited, and violently exploded. The blast seriously injured two workers and damaged 20 nearby residences and five businesses. CSB investigators found that the north wall of the lab and operations building – where the victims were injured – was less than 30 feet from the waste recycling processing area where the flammable vapor was released.
CSB Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “This accident should not have happened. Our report notes that OSHA cited the company for inadequate attention to process safety management practices in the handling of flammable liquids. But in case of an accident, I believe it is absolutely critical that buildings at chemical facilities be sited safe distances from process equipment to maximize the safety of workers. We are making recommendations that would help ensure that operating areas with occupied buildings such as control rooms be sufficiently separated from process areas containing flammable liquids and gases that have the potential to explode.”
The Board issued a recommendation to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which develops codes and standards for industry, urging NFPA to require companies to perform engineering analyses to determine safe separation distances between buildings occupied by administrative and other personnel not essential to process operations, and buildings housing the potentially hazardous process equipment.
The Board also revised a previous recommendation to the Environmental Technology Council, a hazardous waste industry trade group, to petition the NFPA to develop a standard specific to hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This would include guidance on reducing the likelihood of fires, explosions, and releases of hazardous waste.
Dr. Moure noted, “The Environmental Technology Council did not respond adequately to our 2007 recommendation, which we issued following an explosion and massive fire at the Environmental Quality hazardous waste facility in Apex, North Carolina, to work for more stringent standards in the hazardous waste industry. I strongly urge the industry to act now. These facilities, by their nature, contain wide varieties of flammable and toxic materials that can cause significant injury to workers and threaten the well being of nearby communities. Facility owners and operators need stricter technical requirements to improve the safety of life and property.”
The report notes that after a normal run of the tetrahydrafuran (THF) solvent recovery process at the Veolia facility, the unit operator began a routine shutdown. Completing the process required blowing nitrogen back through the circulation piping to clean it, prior to closing valves.
CSB lead investigator Johnnie Banks said, “At the time of the shutdown, witnesses reported hearing the sound of a sudden, loud vapor release and smelling a very strong odor of THF solvent which knocked several employees to their knees. It was a matter of just a couple of minutes until the highly flammable vapor ignited.”
The vapor drifted to the laboratory and operations building and found an ignition source inside the building. A worker in the control room reported being enveloped in a fireball that went through the building. The first explosion knocked over a bank of lockers, severely injuring an employee and pinning him underneath.
Because of the extensive fire damage, the CSB was unable to conclusively determine the exact initiating event for the vapor release, concluding one of two possible scenarios likely occurred. In the first scenario, air may have been drawn into a tank containing THF residue and peroxides, causing increased pressure in the tank and forcing flammable vapor from the tank to escape through a manway cover or a vacuum breaker.
In the second possible scenario, CSB investigators believe a line hose, intended to send pressurized nitrogen into a different tank, may have instead been connected to a tank containing unprocessed, flammable liquid. When the nitrogen was applied, it forced flammable vapor out through the tank vent. In either scenario, the vapor drifted to the operations building and ignited, causing the injuries.
In addition to issuing recommendations to NFPA and the hazardous waste industry, the Board also issued recommendations to Veolia, which is rebuilding the plant. The CSB called on the company to restrict occupancy in buildings in close proximity to the operating plant to personnel trained in the safe operation and orderly shutdown of the plant. The Board also called on the Center for Chemical Process Safety, a division of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, to revise control room siting guidelines to address the characteristics of all Class 1B flammable liquids.
Yet Another Hot Work Accident in Colorado-CSB chief expresses regret
Washington, DC, July 9, 2010 — Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso, chairperson and CEO of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) said today he was saddened by news of the death of a Colorado welder yesterday while performing what is called “hot work” on a storage tank containing flammables at an environmental remediation company in Englewood, Colorado.
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Hot work is defined as welding, cutting, grinding, or other spark-producing activities that can ignite flammable substances. To date in 2010, the CSB has learned of 15 serious hot work-related fires and explosions that caused six reported fatalities and numerous injuries.
Dr. Moure said, “I am saddened by this accident and disturbed that such fatalities continue to occur. The CSB is vitally concerned about hot work accidents and this was expressed in our important safety bulletin and safety video, both issued within the past few months.”
According to information gathered by the CSB from the fire department and the company, a worker was standing on a ladder, welding on the side of a tank partially filled with a mixture of water and flammable hydrocarbons. Sparks ignited flammable vapor and the worker was thrown off the ladder, suffering fatal injuries.
The company stated that although it has a hot work permit system and had provided safety training to the victim, there was no monitoring for a flammable atmosphere before or during the welding. ( What a joke-how can anybody issue a permit when they haven’t measured the flammable gas concentration in the area-do they expect a piece of paper will actually prevent an accident?!). While current OSHA standards prohibit hot work in an explosive atmosphere, OSHA does not explicitly require the use of combustible gas detectors.
There have been more than 60 fatalities since 1990 due to explosions and fires from hot work activities on tanks. In seven of the 11 accidents discussed in the bulletin, no gas testing was performed prior to or during the hot work activities. In the remaining cases, monitoring was conducted improperly.
Dr. Moure said, “There is no secret to preventing these accidents. Companies should require effective monitoring of the atmosphere before and during all welding or other spark-producing activities near tanks that may contain flammable liquids or gases. Monitoring should be frequent or continuous and performed at multiple locations to assure that no flammable vapor is present which could be ignited. Monitoring the atmosphere and following the other six key lessons in our bulletin can help avoid these tragedies.”
CSB finally agrees to investigate root causes of the BP Transocean Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig and oil spill disaster
22nd June, 2010 -Finally, acceding to requests from members of the public and their elected representatives, the US Chemical Safety Board, has agreed to investigate in depth (pun not intended), the circumstances that led to the explosion and sinking of BP’s Transocean Deepwater Horizon and consequent oil spill that has become a national disaster, worse than Hurricane Katrina or the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The fact that the CSB is likely to investigate this accident was already reported on this blog, if you remember.
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Here is the full text of the letter written by Chairman John Bresland of the CSB to Hon. Henry Waxman and Hon. Bart Stupak , both of the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Dear Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak:
I write in response to your letter of June 8, 2010, requesting a CSB investigation of the causes of the BP/Transocean rig explosion that occurred on April 20, 2010. We recognize that this human and ecological disaster is one of the most significant chemical accidents of the current era. We also agree, as noted in your letter, that the CSB’s past work on BP’s safety culture and corporate safety oversight places us in a unique role to understand important aspects of this tragedy. In addition, as we stated to you in our letter of May 7 we are of the opinion that we have the legal authority to investigate this accident. All of us share your hope that every possible lesson will be learned from this accident so that nothing similar ever occurs again.
For all these reasons, the CSB intends to proceed with an investigation of the root causes of the accidental chemical release that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon rig and took the lives of 11 workers. The investigation will include the key investigators who were involved in the CSB’s 2005-2007 investigation of the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery. We intend to prioritize this work and to apply all of our available resources to ensure the best possible investigation.
Although we will be vigilant for any similarities to the Texas City explosion, as suggested in your letter, we believe it is also important that this investigation be approached without any preconceptions and that all possible underlying factors and causes are thoroughly
and objectively examined. Like other CSB investigations, the investigation should include an examination of key technical factors, the safety cultures involved, and the effectiveness of relevant laws, regulations, and industry standards. We further note that there are numerous other investigations of the April 20 accident that have either been announced or are underway, including those of your own committee, various federal regulatory agencies, and the presidential oil spill commission. To the extent possible, we will seek to coordinate and to avoid duplication of effort with those important activities, without compromising our statutory independence.
We would particularly welcome the Committee’s assistance in promoting cooperation with the other investigations that are currently underway, including help with obtaining relevant documents already collected from companies or other parties or otherwise in the possession of federal regulatory agencies. Additionally, we would appreciate the Committee’s help in ensuring the integrity and independence of the CSB investigation, as distinct from any criminal inquiries that may occur. Although we have the highest respect for those inquiries, it is important that law enforcement investigators collect information directly from the parties involved and not via the CSB investigative process, which requires an open exchange of information between key witnesses and our civilian safety investigators.
The CSB plans to focus on events prior to and including the explosion on April 20; we believe that an examination of the response to the disaster and the impact of the ongoing massive oil spill is beyond the CSB’s current resources and abilities.
To conduct this work, the Board will have to make some difficult choices and decisions. As you know, the CSB had a record-high caseload even before this disaster occurred. We already have a higher number of open investigations than we have actual investigators on staff. Accordingly, to investigate the rig disaster, we anticipate that certain extraordinary measures will be required, including:
Bringing certain ongoing investigations to a very rapid conclusion, including investigations of the major explosions at the Kleen Energy power plant (Middletown, CT) and the ConAgra Slim Jim facility (Garner, NC) Terminating certain smaller investigations and placing other investigations on hold pending a further definition of the scope for the BP/Transocean investigation Temporarily reassigning personnel within the agency to support the new investigation Subject to existing Congressional and OMB notification requirements, drawing upon the Board’s $847,000 emergency investigative fund to put in place appropriate contracts and experts as rapidly as possible Requesting supplemental funding, as needed, to ensure a thorough and complete investigation. We note that the total cost of the CSB’s prior investigation on BP Texas City was approximately $2.5 million. However, the new BP/Transocean investigation presents in many respects an even higher level of cost and complexity.
We thank you and the Committee for your recognition of the importance of our safety investigations and for your longstanding support of our mission.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
John S. Bresland
Chairman
Will CSB investigate the BP Transocean Deepwater Horizon accident?
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June 9, 2010- The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) which is an important agency in the government that investigates accidents in the chemicals, oil & gas and similar industries, is being urged to investigate the BP/ Transocean oil rig (Deepwater Horizon) fire and sinking. Chairman John Bresland of the CSB issued the following release given below
Statement from CSB Chairman John Bresland Regarding
House Committee Request to Investigate BP Deepwater Horizon
I have received the letter from Chairmen Waxman and Stupak of the of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, requesting that the CSB investigate the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. It is my desire that the CSB do everything it can to facilitate the request and to undertake the investigation and determine what factors led to the explosion and failure of the blowout prevention system.
The CSB, a small agency, is currently engaged in numerous investigations consuming all of our investigation staff. However, I will be consulting immediately with the rest of the board and with key staff to determine how we may put together a high-performing investigation team.
The CSB thoroughly investigated the BP Texas City refinery explosion of 2005 and issued a lengthy report and hour-long CSB Safety Video following our investigation, and as the letter from the committee chairmen states, we would be in a unique position to address numerous questions about BP’s safety culture and practices, and to answer the questions outlined in the House committee letter today. The CSB investigation report and safety video may be viewed at www.CSB.gov.
In addition, at the CSB’s urgent recommendation in 2005, BP convened a special panel under the leadership of former Secretary of State James Baker to evaluate the safety culture at BP’s North American refineries. That report was published in January 2007.
We will be making key decisions on the matter in the next few days and we thank the Committee on Energy and Commerce for its interest in and support of CSB investigation activities
Union Carbide Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster-seven people convicted
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June 07, 2010- Finally after 25 years or so, Union Carbide’s Bhopal Gas accident case (perhaps the worst chemical industrial accident until now involving the release of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) that killed thousands of people and maimed or disabled thousands) has finally resulted in convictions. Seven people were judged “guilty” due to negligence. They include the then Chairman of the company, the then Vice President of Manufacturing and other such worthies, including a plant shop floor supervisor. The number of Union Carbide executives and employees that were being prosecuted were actually eight, but one of them died of natural causes during the long winded trial.
The punishments seem petty in comparison with the scale of the disaster. Two years of prison plus a $2100 fine. The convicted persons can appeal to a higher court. News reports quoted Sati Nath Sarangi, an advocate for the victims, as “the world’s worst industrial disaster reduced to a traffic accident”, since the charges that were brought to bear were defined as “death due to negilgence” (often cited in fatal traffic accidents in India). Human Rights groups and others advocating the victims interests wanted more stringent laws to apply.
Though the punishments may seem minor, but they do seem to have set a trend-that of holding the company’s top management at that time responsible for accidents in the plant. This should stir into action, many such chairmen and members of the boards of chemical companies (and others that also have hazardous processes like nuclear power) to audit their own backyards. Some of them are only vaguely aware of what goes on in their plants on the shopfloor, they being more concerned with quarterly results and the opinion of stock analysts. They should put some talented people back into engineering and operations, which have seen a steady deterioration in many companies.
Opinions and comments are welcome as usual!
