Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant leak-complete shutdown averted

By Rick | Jun 17, 2010

For an excellent e-learning course on Emergency Shutdown Systems and Safety Instrumented Systems, please click here.

June 16, 2010- The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power plant, operated by Entergy, reportedly had a near emergency shutdown recently when a cooling water valve started leaking heavily. The leak was of the order of 1.6 gallons of radioactive water per minute (far above the “legally allowable” limit of 1 gallon per minute). However regulatory officials and the plant management claimed that there was no immediate danger.

The maintenance team replaced the faulty valve within about five hours after the incident. If they had been unsuccessful, probably the plant would have had to do an emergency shutdown as per the rules. Local sources said that the 38 year old plant was prone to “many leaks” in the recent past, but these reports could not be independently verified. The latest incident underscores however that the public belief that nuclear energy is “far better” than fossil fuel based energy (after the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill) is not correct. Nuclear power plants also have their risks, although the proper engineering and management of the safety systems can mitigate these risks to a large extent. This was also thought before the BP Oil Spill about offshore drilling….now of course we know how that went awry.

OSHA fines BP- Husky refinery more than $ 3 million

By Sam | Mar 13, 2010

Comment

OREGON, Ohio — The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration has cited BP North American Inc. and BP-Husky Refining LLC’s refinery in Oregon, Ohio, with 42 alleged willful violations, including 39 on a per-instance basis, and 20 alleged serious violations for exposing workers to a variety of hazards including failure to provide adequate pressure relief for process units. Proposed penalties total $3,042,000.

“OSHA has found that BP often ignored or severely delayed fixing known hazards in its refineries,” said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. “There is no excuse for taking chances with people’s lives. BP must fix the hazards now.”

OSHA began its inspection at the refinery located near Toledo, Ohio, in September 2009 as part of the agency’s Refinery National Emphasis Program and as a follow-up to a 2006 inspection and a 2007 settlement agreement between OSHA and BP at this location. Although the 2009 inspection found that BP had complied with the settlement agreement, OSHA found numerous violations at the plant not previously covered by the agreement.

The inspection revealed that workers were exposed to serious injury and death in the event of a release of flammable and explosive materials in the refinery because of numerous conditions constituting violations of OSHA’s process safety management standard. OSHA has issued willful citations for numerous failures to provide adequate pressure relief for process units, failures to provide safeguards to prevent the hazardous accumulation of fuel in process heaters, and exposing workers to injury and death from collapse of or damage, in the event of a fire, to nine buildings in the refinery. Additional willful citations allege various other violations of OSHA’s standard addressing process safety management. These citations carry proposed penalties totaling $2,940,000.

The serious citations address a variety of other hazards, including violations of other requirements of the process safety management standard. These carry proposed penalties totaling $102,000.

Since 1991, this refinery has been inspected 12 times. Nationally, BP Products North American has been inspected by OSHA 44 times at various sites and is facing pending cases in which 439 willful citations and failure-to-abate notices were issued to its Texas City Refinery as a result of a 2009 inspection. Proposed penalties in those pending cases total $87 million, the largest penalties by far ever proposed by OSHA. BP’s Texas City Refinery experienced a devastating explosion and fire in 2005 that killed 15 workers and injured 170. A large portion of the penalties proposed for the Texas City Refinery results from OSHA’s allegations that BP failed to fully live up to a settlement agreement entered into after the explosion. BP has contested the citations, notifications of failure-to-abate and the proposed penalties in those cases.

BP North American Inc. operates and jointly owns the refinery with Canadian-based Husky Energy Inc. The company has 15 business days from receipt of the citations to comply, request an information conference with the OSHA area director or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces for their employees. OSHA’s role is to assure these conditions for America’s working men and women by setting and enforcing standards, and providing training, education and assistance.

For more information, visit http://www.osha.gov.

Kleen Energy Explosion-CSB issues report

By Rick | Feb 26, 2010

Comment

Download the shareware book Hazardous Area Classification here for free now!

Feb 25, 2010- The CSB has released a preliminary report about their findings in the Kleen energy power plant explosion that caused fatalities and injuries. Here is the text of the news conference.

The gist of the findings are that companies must take sufficient care to ensure that gas or explosive/inflammable vapors do not happen at all and if they do, they should not meet an ignition source. This is well known to engineers and technicians in the process industries, but apparently it took actual explosions to bring home the truth.

KleenEnergyLeakPhoto

CSB Statement

Good morning I am CSB Lead Investigator Don Holmstrom; thank you for coming to this CSB news conference. The Chemical Safety Board is an independent federal agency that investigates and reports to the public on the causes of major chemical accidents at industrial sites across the country. The CSB is headed by five board members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The CSB’s reports and safety recommendations to Congress, federal and state regulators, and industry are widely followed and applied throughout the United States. Our mission is to prevent disastrous accidents of the kind that occurred here less than three weeks ago.

The safety issues raised by this accident are not limited to Connecticut. These issues are larger than any particular company, facility, or individual. The U.S. has embarked an ambitious construction effort for new natural gas power plants. Thousands and thousands of workers across the country will be involved in constructing these plants. The safety of these workers and the nation’s energy independence are at stake as these gas-fired plants are built over the next 20 years.

The CSB has a team of ten here investigating at the Kleen Energy accident site. On behalf of all of us at the CSB, we extend our deepest condolences to the families of Ronald Crabb, Peter Chepulis, Raymond Dobratz, Kenneth Haskell, Christopher Walters and Roy Rushton. The goal of the CSB investigation is that terrible accidents like this will not happen again and that no families will suffer such tremendous losses in the future.

The CSB team arrived at the site on February 8th. Since that time, the CSB team has conducted a large number of interviews, reviewed documents, and closely examined the accident site on numerous occasions. We appreciate the outstanding cooperation from the workers at this facility, who despite living through such a horrible ordeal have provided valuable information to CSB investigators.

This accident occurred during a planned work activity to clean debris from natural gas pipes at the plant. To remove the debris, workers used natural gas at a high pressure of approximately 650 pounds per square inch. The high velocity of the natural gas flow was intended to remove any debris in the new piping. At pre-determined locations, this gas was vented to the atmosphere through open pipe ends which were located less than 20 feet off the ground. These vents were adjacent to the main power generation building and along the south wall. The open pipe ends are visible here in the photographs.

You can actually see the high-pressure gas venting out of one of these open pipe ends in this photograph taken a short time before the accident on February 7.

This cleaning practice is known within the natural gas power industry as a “gas blow.” Industry personnel have indicated to CSB investigators that gas blows are a common practice during the commissioning of new or modified gas pipes at their facilities.

CSB investigators have reviewed gas utility records for the morning of the accident. These records together with written pipe cleaning procedures and witness testimony confirm that the gas blows occurred intermittently over the course of the morning. At the same time that gas blows were underway, there were potential ignition sources present in the surrounding area, including inside the power plant building. There were many construction-related activities underway inside the building.

Determining the exact ignition source is not a major focus of our investigation at this point. In most industrial worksites, ignition sources are abundant and efforts at accident prevention focus first and foremost on avoiding or controlling the release of flammable gas or vapor.

Initial calculations by CSB investigators reveal that approximately 400,000 standard cubic feet of gas were released to the atmosphere near the building in the final ten minutes before the blast.

That is enough natural gas to fill the entire volume of a pro-basketball arena with an explosive natural gas-air mixture, from the floor to the ceiling.

This gas was released into a congested area next to the power block building. This congested area likely slowed the dispersion of the gas. The gas built up above the lower explosive limit of approximately 4% in air and was ignited by an undetermined ignition source.

In the days since the accident, companies and safety regulators from around the world have contacted the CSB asking about the circumstances of this devastating accident. Some companies, including a power plant here in the region, indicated that they themselves have been planning similar gas blows as part of commissioning pipes in the very near future.

A major focus of the CSB investigation is to determine what regulations, codes, and good practices might apply to these gas blows. To this point, no specific codes have been identified, but we are continuing our research.

In the meantime, we strongly caution natural gas power plants and other industries against the venting of high-pressure natural gas in or near work sites. This practice, although common, is inherently unsafe.

The CSB is investigating possible alternatives to this practice, including the use of air, steam, nitrogen, or water or the use of combustion devices to safely destroy the gas. Combustion devices like flares can safely burn up flammable gas or vapor, preventing the possibility of an explosion.

Recommending safer alternatives will be a primary focus of the CSB investigation as we move forward.

Just three days prior to this tragic accident, the Chemical Safety Board recommended changes to the National Fuel Gas Code to prevent disastrous explosions involving gas purging. We note with great appreciation that just yesterday, at a meeting in San Francisco, the NFPA panel responsible for the fuel gas code voted to move forward with the CSB’s recommendations to make purging practices safer at work sites across America. These provisions will apply at hundreds of thousands of facilities, once fully adopted.

The type of purging described in that code is different from the gas blows used in the power industry, and power plants remain exempt from the national fuel gas code. However, gas purging as defined in the code has certain similarities to gas blows, in that gas is applied at one end of a pipe and gas is intentionally vented at the other end to the atmosphere.

There is an underlying common theme among the tragic accidents at Kleen Energy, the ConAgra Slim Jim plant in North Carolina, the Ford River Rouge power plant in Michigan, the Hilton Hotel in San Diego, and many other purging-related accidents. Companies must ensure that flammable gases are not vented into close proximity with ignition sources and workers. That is a vital safety message from all these tragedies.

We encourage the gas power industry to closely study the very positive actions recommended by the NFPA and the American Gas Association committees yesterday. The CSB investigation will focus on determining what permanent changes in standards or practices are needed to prevent future accidents involving gas blows.

Note: If you are looking to train your staff in Gas Monitors, Hazardous Area Classification, Safety Instrumented Systems and similar useful topics, look no further than here. You will find excellent cost-effective courses, that deliver value.

Safety Guidelines-which ones do you follow?

By Sam | Jul 21, 2009

Comment

We all have several safety guidelines in our plants. Some are given as top management directives, some are given out by the local authorities, some by the federal/higher government authorities like OSHA/ other independent bodies like the US Chemical Safety Board and some others are plant and process specific only. Some of these are introduced, only after something goes awry in the process and results in near misses or accidents. Plus, there are several international standards that many companies follow, in addition to their own plant specific safety guidelines.

So my question to you all is this- Which ones of these do you actually follow? All of them, or only those that you deem necessary? If you do follow all of them, how do you prioritize them? Does anybody audit your plant to check if all these various guidelines are adhered to? Or does nobody bother at all until the point at which an accident or disaster happens and all hell breaks loose? Do you have all of these in a single location where any employee or workman/contractor can access it easily? Is it important to you and your company that these guidelines be stored at a location that is easily accessible to all stakeholders?

Please use the comment form below. Please note that inappropriate comments will be deleted.

Hot work without a gas test-when will people ever learn?

By Rick | Apr 4, 2009

Comment

Another accident has been reported due to negligence and lack of an understanding of hazardous materials and their properties. Fortunately there have been no fatalities, only two injuries, but they are severe and the victims have been hospitalized, reports the Merced Sun Star, in a news item dated April, 02, 2009.

The two injured men were workers in a produce plant (A.V.Thomas Produce, 3900 Sultana Drive, Atwater, Merced County, CA ), who were using an Acetylene blowtorch on a fuel tank. They were trying to loosen a compression bolt on the fuel tank, when it exploded. Common safety procedures apparently were not followed. The tank exploded, causing second- and third-degree burns to 30 and 50 percent of the men’s bodies, according to Cal Fire Battalion Chief Kevin Lawson. Read the full story here.

It is very clear what caused the explosion. It is not the usage of an acetylene torch or the presence of volatile flammable materials near a naked flame, it was IGNORANCE that caused the explosion. A basic safety training in the hazards of volatile organic compounds like gasoline or diesel would have helped. There was no gas test to detect %LEL near the fuel tank, nor any “hot work” permit system.

When will we ever learn?