Kleen Energy Explosion-CSB issues report

By Rick | Feb 26, 2010

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Feb 25, 2010- The CSB has released a preliminary report about their findings in the Kleen energy power plant explosion that caused fatalities and injuries. Here is the text of the news conference.

The gist of the findings are that companies must take sufficient care to ensure that gas or explosive/inflammable vapors do not happen at all and if they do, they should not meet an ignition source. This is well known to engineers and technicians in the process industries, but apparently it took actual explosions to bring home the truth.

KleenEnergyLeakPhoto

CSB Statement

Good morning I am CSB Lead Investigator Don Holmstrom; thank you for coming to this CSB news conference. The Chemical Safety Board is an independent federal agency that investigates and reports to the public on the causes of major chemical accidents at industrial sites across the country. The CSB is headed by five board members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The CSB’s reports and safety recommendations to Congress, federal and state regulators, and industry are widely followed and applied throughout the United States. Our mission is to prevent disastrous accidents of the kind that occurred here less than three weeks ago.

The safety issues raised by this accident are not limited to Connecticut. These issues are larger than any particular company, facility, or individual. The U.S. has embarked an ambitious construction effort for new natural gas power plants. Thousands and thousands of workers across the country will be involved in constructing these plants. The safety of these workers and the nation’s energy independence are at stake as these gas-fired plants are built over the next 20 years.

The CSB has a team of ten here investigating at the Kleen Energy accident site. On behalf of all of us at the CSB, we extend our deepest condolences to the families of Ronald Crabb, Peter Chepulis, Raymond Dobratz, Kenneth Haskell, Christopher Walters and Roy Rushton. The goal of the CSB investigation is that terrible accidents like this will not happen again and that no families will suffer such tremendous losses in the future.

The CSB team arrived at the site on February 8th. Since that time, the CSB team has conducted a large number of interviews, reviewed documents, and closely examined the accident site on numerous occasions. We appreciate the outstanding cooperation from the workers at this facility, who despite living through such a horrible ordeal have provided valuable information to CSB investigators.

This accident occurred during a planned work activity to clean debris from natural gas pipes at the plant. To remove the debris, workers used natural gas at a high pressure of approximately 650 pounds per square inch. The high velocity of the natural gas flow was intended to remove any debris in the new piping. At pre-determined locations, this gas was vented to the atmosphere through open pipe ends which were located less than 20 feet off the ground. These vents were adjacent to the main power generation building and along the south wall. The open pipe ends are visible here in the photographs.

You can actually see the high-pressure gas venting out of one of these open pipe ends in this photograph taken a short time before the accident on February 7.

This cleaning practice is known within the natural gas power industry as a “gas blow.” Industry personnel have indicated to CSB investigators that gas blows are a common practice during the commissioning of new or modified gas pipes at their facilities.

CSB investigators have reviewed gas utility records for the morning of the accident. These records together with written pipe cleaning procedures and witness testimony confirm that the gas blows occurred intermittently over the course of the morning. At the same time that gas blows were underway, there were potential ignition sources present in the surrounding area, including inside the power plant building. There were many construction-related activities underway inside the building.

Determining the exact ignition source is not a major focus of our investigation at this point. In most industrial worksites, ignition sources are abundant and efforts at accident prevention focus first and foremost on avoiding or controlling the release of flammable gas or vapor.

Initial calculations by CSB investigators reveal that approximately 400,000 standard cubic feet of gas were released to the atmosphere near the building in the final ten minutes before the blast.

That is enough natural gas to fill the entire volume of a pro-basketball arena with an explosive natural gas-air mixture, from the floor to the ceiling.

This gas was released into a congested area next to the power block building. This congested area likely slowed the dispersion of the gas. The gas built up above the lower explosive limit of approximately 4% in air and was ignited by an undetermined ignition source.

In the days since the accident, companies and safety regulators from around the world have contacted the CSB asking about the circumstances of this devastating accident. Some companies, including a power plant here in the region, indicated that they themselves have been planning similar gas blows as part of commissioning pipes in the very near future.

A major focus of the CSB investigation is to determine what regulations, codes, and good practices might apply to these gas blows. To this point, no specific codes have been identified, but we are continuing our research.

In the meantime, we strongly caution natural gas power plants and other industries against the venting of high-pressure natural gas in or near work sites. This practice, although common, is inherently unsafe.

The CSB is investigating possible alternatives to this practice, including the use of air, steam, nitrogen, or water or the use of combustion devices to safely destroy the gas. Combustion devices like flares can safely burn up flammable gas or vapor, preventing the possibility of an explosion.

Recommending safer alternatives will be a primary focus of the CSB investigation as we move forward.

Just three days prior to this tragic accident, the Chemical Safety Board recommended changes to the National Fuel Gas Code to prevent disastrous explosions involving gas purging. We note with great appreciation that just yesterday, at a meeting in San Francisco, the NFPA panel responsible for the fuel gas code voted to move forward with the CSB’s recommendations to make purging practices safer at work sites across America. These provisions will apply at hundreds of thousands of facilities, once fully adopted.

The type of purging described in that code is different from the gas blows used in the power industry, and power plants remain exempt from the national fuel gas code. However, gas purging as defined in the code has certain similarities to gas blows, in that gas is applied at one end of a pipe and gas is intentionally vented at the other end to the atmosphere.

There is an underlying common theme among the tragic accidents at Kleen Energy, the ConAgra Slim Jim plant in North Carolina, the Ford River Rouge power plant in Michigan, the Hilton Hotel in San Diego, and many other purging-related accidents. Companies must ensure that flammable gases are not vented into close proximity with ignition sources and workers. That is a vital safety message from all these tragedies.

We encourage the gas power industry to closely study the very positive actions recommended by the NFPA and the American Gas Association committees yesterday. The CSB investigation will focus on determining what permanent changes in standards or practices are needed to prevent future accidents involving gas blows.

Note: If you are looking to train your staff in Gas Monitors, Hazardous Area Classification, Safety Instrumented Systems and similar useful topics, look no further than here. You will find excellent cost-effective courses, that deliver value.

Safety Guidelines-which ones do you follow?

By Sam | Jul 21, 2009

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We all have several safety guidelines in our plants. Some are given as top management directives, some are given out by the local authorities, some by the federal/higher government authorities like OSHA/ other independent bodies like the US Chemical Safety Board and some others are plant and process specific only. Some of these are introduced, only after something goes awry in the process and results in near misses or accidents. Plus, there are several international standards that many companies follow, in addition to their own plant specific safety guidelines.

So my question to you all is this- Which ones of these do you actually follow? All of them, or only those that you deem necessary? If you do follow all of them, how do you prioritize them? Does anybody audit your plant to check if all these various guidelines are adhered to? Or does nobody bother at all until the point at which an accident or disaster happens and all hell breaks loose? Do you have all of these in a single location where any employee or workman/contractor can access it easily? Is it important to you and your company that these guidelines be stored at a location that is easily accessible to all stakeholders?

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Hot work without a gas test-when will people ever learn?

By Rick | Apr 4, 2009

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Another accident has been reported due to negligence and lack of an understanding of hazardous materials and their properties. Fortunately there have been no fatalities, only two injuries, but they are severe and the victims have been hospitalized, reports the Merced Sun Star, in a news item dated April, 02, 2009.

The two injured men were workers in a produce plant (A.V.Thomas Produce, 3900 Sultana Drive, Atwater, Merced County, CA ), who were using an Acetylene blowtorch on a fuel tank. They were trying to loosen a compression bolt on the fuel tank, when it exploded. Common safety procedures apparently were not followed. The tank exploded, causing second- and third-degree burns to 30 and 50 percent of the men’s bodies, according to Cal Fire Battalion Chief Kevin Lawson. Read the full story here.

It is very clear what caused the explosion. It is not the usage of an acetylene torch or the presence of volatile flammable materials near a naked flame, it was IGNORANCE that caused the explosion. A basic safety training in the hazards of volatile organic compounds like gasoline or diesel would have helped. There was no gas test to detect %LEL near the fuel tank, nor any “hot work” permit system.

When will we ever learn?


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Portable Gas Monitors- new ways to use them

By Rick | Dec 21, 2008

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All of us a ware of portable gas monitors, those instruments with the built in sensors that give out an alarm in case they detect the presence of a gas (or fail to detect a sufficient level of a gas like Oxygen). We all know how to use them. We use portable LEL meters, before starting any welding or “hot work” in a hazardous area, we use portable Oxygen gas detectors before attempting to enter a confined space area for working and so on. But can we use these meters for other purposes? Sure, we can. If you notice if you carry a perfectly calibrated Oxygen monitor to a remote unpolluted area, what reading do you expect. 20.8 % Oxygen or even slightly better (I am not considering high mountainous regions that are low in Oxygen content). What reading do you get in your plant near all your reactors and distillation towers and tanks? Maybe 20.6 % or even lesser. What does that say about your workplace? Do a little “workplace monitoring” with these things, you’ll be surprised.

Now for some fun with the LEL meters. Take one of these to all the designated “hazardous” areas (all the Division 1, Zone 1, areas) and the designated “safe” areas and monitor the LEL levels. If your area classification is still current, you should not get any surprises. If not, well, you need to really rethink.

Caveat: A hazardous area (Even a Zone 0 or Zone 1) does not mean that you will have explosive gases and vapors all the time. Of course not! Otherwise your plant is really something that can get shut down by the authorities. But if you take these readings for a sufficient number of times, you can find out if for example the boundaries of your hazardous areas are OK or should they be extended? Are your safe areas immune to those vapors that may creep in when say some manholes on nearby reactors are opened? Are your double mechanical seals on your pumps really working properly? And so on. One round in your plant with these little meters will really give you a picture of how things really are…good, bad or ugly.

Use Gas Detectors to improve safety-lessons from an industrial accident

By abhisam1 | Aug 31, 2008

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This post shows how easy it can be, to build-in safety into your plant, by using the right kind of gas detector. Continuing our “Case study” series, we show below how a simple gas detector, had it been installed, could have easily prevented a major industrial catastrophe.

The video below show the US Chemical Safety Board accident investigation of an explosion, that rocked the industrial facility of Sterigenics International, Ontario, California. Apparently, among many things that went wrong, one glaring fact that stands out was the non use of gas monitors in the facility. Even a simple gas detector based on catalytic combustion principles, that could have measured hazardous levels of explosive gas, could have prevented the incident.

Gas monitors and gas detectors can be used very effectively in preventing such kinds of accidents, to a large extent. Ignorance about usage can no longer be a reason, since there is an excellent training course on gas detectors now available. This downloadable course on gas monitors, will enable you to understand all about safety concepts like TWA & TLV, different methods of gas detection, how gas monitors work, how to select and install a gas monitor that works and how to calibrate and maintain them so that they continue to maintain your plant in a safe state.

Well, enough on that, I am sure you will check it out. Meanwhile, here’s the video. Very graphic but also very illuminating. View it and draw your own conclusions. As always, comments are welcome!