NFPA amends the Fuel Gas Code to prevent purging of pipelines using natural gas after Kleen explosion
Aug 11, 2010- The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), through an emergency revision to the NFPA 2009 code, has prohibited the purging of gas pipelines by using natural gas. This is a direct fallout of the Kleen Energy accident investigation, after the US Chemical Safety Board concluded that the purging by natural gas led to the accident. The CSB had also appealed to standards and regulatory bodies like OSHA and NFPA to amend the codes that regulate natural gas piping and operations in view of these findings. We had reported all about it here.
The NFPA has now responded by issuing aTentative Interim Amendment to Section 54 of the Natural Gas Code. This can be downloaded from here.
(Note: The code specifically talks about installing a gas detector to detect the presence of natural gas-if you would like to know how to specify, select, install, calibrate and maintain these gas detectors, please click here)
The CSB was glad to hear about this and the agency has issued a statement reproduced below.
Here’s the CSB statement (in Italics)
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Emergency Change to National Fuel Gas Code Addresses Cause of Fatal June 2009 Blast at ConAgra Slim Jim Plant in North Carolina
On February 4, 2010, I presided at a Chemical Safety Board public meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina, to present the CSB’s findings on the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim manufacturing plant in the nearby community of Garner.
That tragic and preventable accident cost four lives, injured 67 others, and led to a decision to close the plant, with the loss of hundreds of jobs in the region. The accident occurred during an operation to purge (or clear air) from a new steel gas-supply pipe that was connected to a newly installed industrial water heater. The pipe was connected at the other end to the building’s natural gas distribution system. During the purging operation, gas was allowed to flow through the pipe and exit through an open valve inside the utility room where the water heater was located. Due to difficulties in lighting the water heater, the purging operation was continued for an unusually long time, eventually causing gas to accumulate above the lower explosive limit inside the building. The gas contacted an ignition source and exploded, causing extensive sections of the large facility to collapse.
The CSB noted that the accident at ConAgra was but one of a number of similar explosions caused by an intentional, planned work activity that inadvertently led to a large and unsafe release of natural gas into a workplace.
At the time of the accident, indoor purging of natural gas systems was not prohibited under the National Fuel Gas Code, a key consensus code of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) that has been adopted by many states and localities across the country. At the February 4 public meeting, the Board voted to make urgent recommendations to NFPA and the International Code Council to prohibit indoor purging and require companies and installers to purge flammable fuel gases to safe locations outdoors, away from workers and ignition sources.
I am pleased that the NFPA made our recommendation a high priority and took immediate steps to improve the National Fuel Gas Code. Last week, on August 5, the NFPA Standards Council gave final approval to an emergency code change, known as a Tentative Interim Amendment, that will prohibit indoor purging of industrial gas lines operating at greater than two pounds per square inch gauge (psig) or meeting certain pipe size criteria. According to the NFPA, the new requirements are designed to require outdoor purging for industrial, large commercial, and large multifamily buildings.
These new provisions would have required the gas pipe at ConAgra to be purged outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources. Under the new requirements, purging must be monitored using appropriate detection equipment to prevent a significant release of flammable gas. The new requirements are similar to new safety procedures developed and implemented by both ConAgra and the State of North Carolina in the months following the tragedy.
Outdoor purging is inherently safer than venting gas into a building. Had the gas pipe at ConAgra been safely purged outdoors, the explosion and resulting deaths and injuries could have been avoided.
I encourage all companies to study the new code recommendations and to purge flammable gases outdoors whenever possible. I urge the NFPA to ensure that a prohibition on indoor purging and other safeguards are permanently incorporated into the National Fuel Gas Code, and I thank the NFPA leadership and members for their positive actions to promote worker safety.
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Kleen Energy Explosion impact-CSB urges OSHA to ban gas purging of pipelines
Aug 05, 2010-The Chemical Safety Board has now recommended OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) to ban purging of pipelines with natural gas, that can cause explosions. This should have been done a long time back, but it was only after the Kleen Energy explosion that things started moving in this direction.
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This is rather surprising for evrybody in the chemicals, petrochemicals and oil industries who have operated boilers, fired heaters, etc are aware that before starting any burner, some purging is to be done with air, to drive away residual gas in the burning chamber to prevent explosions and back firing. However it is surprining that in many natural gas processing facilities instead of using Nitrogen or compressed air for purging, they use the natural gas itself. This in itself may not be entirely unsafe IF and this is a BIG IF that the surroundings are free of ignition sources of any kind and the gas can quickly dilute below its % LEL (lower explosive limit). However in the Kleen energy kind of situation where there was large scale welding and cutting going on, with plenty of sparks flying around, it is surprising that the regular venting of natural gas purging resulted in just one explosion…theoretically it should have resulted in many!
There is an urgent need for people to understand the principles of explosion protection, classified areas, hazardous area classification, gas monitoring and other such concepts to prevent Kleen energy like incidents.
Anyways, here’s what the CSB now says (reproduced from their website)
Statement of CSB Chairperson Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso Urges OSHA to Adopt CSB Recommendation Prohibiting Flammable Gas Blows During Pipe Cleaning Operations
On June 28, 2010, at a public meeting in Portland, Connecticut, the Chemical Safety Board voted to issue 18 urgent recommendations to various recipients, including OSHA, aimed at halting the dangerous practice of releasing large quantities of flammable gas in the presence of workers and ignition sources during cleaning operations.
Six workers were killed and there were numerous injuries on February 7, 2010, at the Kleen Energy power plant under construction in Middletown, Connecticut.
A recommendation to OSHA called for, among other things, the promulgation of regulations to prohibit the release of flammable gas to the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning fuel gas piping.
Today, OSHA announced citations and proposed fines against construction companies and contractors at the Kleen Energy power plant construction site and announced a plan to notify natural gas power plant operators of the dangers of natural gas blows.
I was pleased that during his news conference, Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for OSHA, stated his agency is studying the CSB recommendation to prohibit flammable gas releases during cleaning operations, and that OSHA agrees with the CSB that this problem must be addressed immediately.
Dr. Michaels stated that OSHA likely does not have the authority to prohibit the use of flammable gases during pipe cleaning operations, and that promulgating such a regulation would take years.
The CSB believes that OSHA does have adequate authority to take this action and to start the standard setting process at any time.
The CSB found that the practice of gas blows is inherently unsafe. In its investigation of the Kleen Energy accident, the CSB found that several safe alternatives to pipe cleaning are available to the industry are already in use, such as compressed air, nitrogen and the use of a solid cleaning device propelled by compressed air that is referred to as a pig. Furthermore, the CSB found companies have already begun to ban the practice. And at least one leading manufacturer of natural gas electric turbines, General Electric, has informed its customers it will not support the practice of gas blows to clear out pipes leading to the turbines. A GE official discussed this during the CSB public meeting held in June in Connecticut.
END STATEMENT
Horsehead Holding Company Zinc processing accident-CSB to investigate
Washington, DC, August 3, 2010 – The U.S. Chemical Safety Board announced today that it will be conducting a full investigation into the July 22, 2010, explosion and fire that killed two workers at the Horsehead Holding Company zinc recycling facility located in Monaca, PA.
On July 25, the CSB deployed a three-person assessment team to the accident site. Investigators interviewed company personnel and documented the scene. The facility, which recycles and purifies zinc through a high temperature distillation process, is located approximately 35 miles north of Pittsburgh. Preliminary interviews indicate there was a loss of containment from the lower section of one of the distillation columns.
CSB Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “I am very concerned about the safety of this type of production process for the workers and the community. There may be other facilities across the country that are using a similar metal distillation process; the CSB will be examining how to increase the safety of this type of operation.”
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.
BP says oil leak plugged for now
July 15- BP has said today that the Deepwater Horizon Macondo oil leak has been finally plugged, after almost 87 days of mayhem. BP says that the well is now fully shut-in and no oil is flowing into the Gulf now. This news has been greeted by cautious optimism in the states bordering the Gulf Of Mexico. The oil is being collected by the new cap and the gas is being flared. The BP web site reported that “For the first 12 hours on July 15 (midnight to noon), approximately 5,875 barrels of oil were collected and approximately 3,430 barrels of oil and 22.5 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared”
The stopping of the oil leak has brought cheers to the states that border the Gulf of Mexico, but the news is being treated with cautious optimism. Observers are not sure whether the cap can last and whether the leak has really stopped.
‘I think it is a positive sign,’ President Barack Obama said carefully when asked about the oil flow after he made a statement about Wall Street reform’s passage in the Senate. ‘We’re still in the testing phase. I’ll have more to say about it tomorrow.’
Bobby Jindal, the Governor of Louisiana was also cautious in commenting. He said that he was “cautiously optimistic” about the plugging. But, he said, ‘Work to revitalise our coast won’t be done until our waters and our shores are completely clean and our wildlife, our communities and our coastal industries are 100 percent restored.’
Let us all hope that the new containment cap does its job well and so the task of cleanup can really begin in earnest.
Jaipur Oil Tank Farm Fire update-nine officials arrested for negligence
July 3, 2010 Jaipur, India- The Oil Tank farm here belonging to Indian Oil Corporation, a large Indian government owned oil company had a devastating fire about eight months ago. The reports were posted on this blog at that time.
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The fire had resulted in 11 fatalities and destruction of oil worth millions., plus a lot of collateral damage was caused to an adjacent factory. The fire had raged on for several days and had was very difficult to control and extinguish.
Well, now the investigation into the accident is over and nine officers have been found guilty of gross negligence. The investigation speed was surprisingly fast (look at how the Bhopal case went on for decades before resulting in convictions) and nine officers of the company, including a General Manager, have been arrested on charges of gross negligence. Such arrests, will hopefully, instill enough respect for Industrial Safety in organisations that pay only lip service to the philosophy of safety.
As in most other cases of accidents, the result of the mishap occuring was the end result of a lot of events, not just the result of one event. Look at what facts were dug out and presented by the investigation team:
- Non working Public Address System
- Non implementation of Emergency Response Procedures-so the police control room was informed of the accident after ONE HOUR after the accident
- Apparent non working of any automation system that was supposedly installed at the facility to prevent overfilling
This means that if a plant or facility is well designed by competent engineers and also well maintained, then it will automatically ensure safety. However the operations of the systems that have been installed years ago need to be checked at least every year by third parties (as is the practice in many countries). For sure this being done for mechanical items like pressure vessels and safety relief valves, but is it being done for Instrumentation and Control Systems, or other systems like Public Address Systems? The sooner this is done seriously, we will have lesser chances of such accidents-be it the BP Deepwater Horizon spill or the Jaipur tank farm fire.
