Hazards of hot work-CSB issues safety bulletin

By Sam | Mar 8, 2010

This blog has consistently pointed out that many people working in industry seem to be unaware about the dangers of doing any “hot” work in a plant without a “gas test”. Despite several disasters that have been directly caused due to following this simple rule, nobody seems to have learnt lessons. The US Chemical Safety Board now has come up with a safety bulletin, outlining the recent case of the fatal accident at the PCA corrugated mill in Wisconsin, that was apparently caused by not checking for explosive gases with a portable explosive gas monitor, before commencing welding operations. The tank was also not classified as a hazardous area, despite it being used to store explosive and flammable materials.

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The CSB has issued a safety bulletin that details the incident, as well as precautionary measures that should be taken to avoid such incidents from recurring. Here is a partial text of the press release given below.

Wausau, Wisconsin, March 4, 2010 – The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today issued a safety bulletin warning of the hazards of conducting hot work in a variety of industries and identifying seven key lessons aimed at preventing worker deaths during hot work in and around storage tanks containing flammable materials.

Hot work is defined as any work activity that involves burning, welding, cutting, brazing, grinding, soldering, or similar spark-producing operations that can ignite a flammable atmosphere

The CSB began investigating hot work hazards following an explosion that occurred on July 29, 2008, at the Packaging Corporation of America (PCA) corrugated cardboard mill in Tomahawk, Wisconsin, which killed three maintenance workers and injured another. The CSB determined the explosion resulted from welding above an 80-foot-tall storage tank that contained highly flammable hydrogen gas – the product of bacterial decomposition of organic fiber waste inside the tank.

At the time of the accident, PCA did not recognize waste fiber tanks as potentially hazardous or require combustible gas monitoring prior to welding nearby. PCA, which fully cooperated with the CSB investigation, subsequently developed new company standards requiring gas monitoring before any hot work.

“Hot work around flammable gas or vapor is one of the most common causes of worker deaths that we see at the Chemical Safety Board,” said CSB Board Member William B. Wark. ”Tragically, most of these accidents are readily preventable with better hazard assessments, proper gas monitoring, and other straightforward safety measures.”

In the ten months following the explosion at Packaging Corporation, the CSB deployed investigators to five other sites where hot work ignited flammable gas or vapor, including an explosion at MAR Oil in La Rue, Ohio, that killed two contractors in October 2008; an explosion that killed one and injured another at EMC Used Oil in Miami, Florida, in December 2008; an explosion that killed a contract welder at ConAgra Foods in Boardman, Oregon, in February 2009; an explosion at A.V. Thomas Produce in Atwater, California, in March 2009 that severely burned two employees; and the explosion of a massive gasoline storage tank that killed three workers at a TEPPCO Partners fuel distribution facility in Garner, Arkansas, in May 2009.

The CSB also collected information from the Honolulu Fire Department about a fatal hot work explosion at a waste oil company in October 2008 and noted findings from previous major hot work explosions in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Florida, and Mississippi that were investigated by the CSB or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

“Companies need to develop comprehensive systems for controlling the hazards of hot work where flammable vapor could be present,” said CSB Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom, who led the investigations. ”Regulators, companies, and workers should recognize that combustible gas monitoring will save lives. A common feature of virtually all these accidents is the failure to recognize all the locations where a flammable atmosphere could be present. The absence of flammables needs to be verified before and during any hot work.”

Combustible gas monitors are relatively inexpensive, handheld electronic instruments that measure the amount of flammable material in the atmosphere, expressed as a percentage of the lower explosive limit. Proper training and calibration are essential for using gas monitors effectively.

The safety bulletin, entitled “Seven Key Lessons to Prevent Worker Deaths During Hot Work In and Around Tanks,” notes that the CSB has identified over 60 fatalities since 1990 due to explosions and fires from hot work activities on tanks. Mr. Holmstrom said those accidents have continued to occur since May 2009, the date of the last explosion covered in the bulletin.

Industries where hot work explosions have occurred include food processing, pulp and paper manufacturing, oil production and recycling, waste treatment, fuel storage and distribution.

Kleen Energy Power Plant Explosion-CSB deploys investigation team

By Sam | Feb 8, 2010

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Washington, DC, February 7, 2010 - The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is deploying a seven-person team to the site of a fatal explosion at the Kleen Energy Plant in Middletown, Connecticut. The team is expected on site midday on Monday, February 8.

According to media reports, the explosion at approximately 11:30 a.m. resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries and caused off-site damage.

CSB lead investigator Don Holmstrom said, “The CSB’s investigative team will examine the activities that were ongoing at the time of this accident, including any gas purging, as indicated by initial media reports.”

At a public meeting on Thursday, February 4, the CSB issued urgent recommendations that the national fuel gas codes be changed to improve safety when gas pipes are being purged - cleared of air - during maintenance or the installation of new piping. The Board’s urgent recommendations resulted from the CSB’s ongoing federal investigation into the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim production facility in Garner, North Carolina, which caused four deaths, three critical life-threatening burn injuries, and other injuries that sent a total of 67 people to the hospital.

The CSB issued a safety bulletin on gas purging in October 2009, because of the occurrence of multiple serious accidents during purging operations. Key safety lessons described in the bulletin included purging gases to a safe location outdoors away from ignition sources, evacuating non-essential workers during purging, using combustible gas monitors to detect any hazardous gas accumulations, and effective training for personnel involved in purging operations.

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Explosion at Kleen plant in Middletown-several fatalities?

By Sam | Feb 8, 2010

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Sunday, Feb07,2010 -Middletown, CT

There was a big explosion and fire at the Kleen power plant in Middletown, Connecticut, that may have had several fatalities. More than 100 divisions of Police, Fire department and other Emergency services were responded to the accident. The injured were being shifted to hospitals and emergency care facilities by helicopters. A search for survivors in the blast rubble at the site is on.

Apparently the plant had not yet opened and was still in the construction phase. People several miles away heard the blast and shockwaves. The gas based power plant had several contractors working on it. An unconfirmed report claimed that a survivor said that he was thrown up 30 feet in the air due to the blast!

The blast was so powerful that it could be heard for several tens of miles in the area surrounding the plant. Residents of Clinton, Prospect, Madison, Deep River, Ivoryton and Durham could feel the impact.

Reporters are not being allowed entry near the site by emergency officials.

Though the cause has not yet identified, it appears to have happened during gas line purging. Ironically just two days ago the CSB has voted to change the codes that apply to this kind of operation, due to the findings in the Conagara Slim Jim blast.

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Urgent Gas Code Recommendations to be considered by CSB

By Sam | Feb 4, 2010

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UPDATED 9 p.m. February 4 - On a 2-1 vote, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board tonight approved urgent safety recommendations on gas purging safety at a public meeting in Raleigh, following extensive testimony and public comment. The draft recommendations, which were approved as presented by the staff without amendment, urged the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American Gas Association (AGA), and the International Code Council (ICC) to strengthen the national fuel gas code provisions on purging. Board Chairman John Bresland and Member William Wark voted to approve; Board Member William Wright voted to disapprove.

Raleigh, NC, February 4, 2010 - The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is set to consider two urgent recommendations that national fuel gas codes be changed to improve safety when gas pipes are being purged (cleared of air) during maintenance or installation of new piping.
The recommendations - to be voted on by board members at a CSB public meeting in Raleigh tonight - grow out of the CSB’s ongoing federal investigation into the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim production facility in Garner, North Carolina, which caused four deaths, three critical life-threatening burn injuries, and other injuries that sent a total of 67 people to the hospital.

ConAgra Slim Jim Blast Photo
In preliminary findings to be presented at a news conference this morning and at the public meeting tonight, CSB investigators determined that the catastrophic explosion resulted from the accumulation of significant amounts of natural gas that had been purged indoors from a new 120-foot length of pipe during the startup of a new water heater in the plant that made Slim Jims, a popular beef-jerky product. During pipe purging, workers feed pressurized gas into a pipe in order to displace air or other gases so that only pure fuel gas remains in the piping when it is connected to an appliance such as a water heater or boiler.

CSB Chairman John Bresland said, “The board is very concerned that companies across the country continue to purge pipes indoors, and this evening we will consider recommendations to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Gas Association (AGA) and the International Code Council (ICC). Currently, the codes of the NFPA and ICC do not require gases to be vented outdoors or define adequate ventilation or hazardous conditions, nor do they require the use of combustible-gas detectors during these operations. The CSB recommendations, if adopted, would urge that these things be done.”

The NFPA and the ICC are prominent organizations whose codes are used and followed by government bodies, private organizations and individuals nationwide.

CSB investigations supervisor Donald Holmstrom said his team made the recommendations to the board during the course of the ConAgra investigation after discovering gaps in the fuel gas codes. “Purging flammable gases into building interiors is a recipe for disaster. At ConAgra, we determined the accident would not have happened had the gas been vented safely outdoors through a hose or pipe.” Mr. Holmstrom noted that since the June 2009 accident, ConAgra has instituted strict policies on purging, requiring it be done to safe outdoor locations.

As proposed, the CSB recommendations would urge the NFPA, the American Gas Association (AGA), and the ICC to enact tentative interim and then permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code. These would require that purged gases shall be vented “to a safe location outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources.” In cases where outdoor venting is not possible, companies would be required to seek a variance from local officials before purging gas indoors, including approval of a risk evaluation and hazard control plan. The recommendation would also require the use of combustible gas detectors to continuously monitor gas concentrations; the training of personnel about the problems of odor fade and odor fatigue; and warnings against the use of odor alone for detecting releases of fuel gases.

The CSB issued a safety bulletin in October 2009 entitled “Dangers of Purging Gas Piping into Buildings.” The bulletin’s key lesson is: “Purging new or existing gas piping into a building can be highly hazardous due to the possible accumulation of gas … and the associated danger of fire and explosion.” It notes that large numbers of workers are at risk, including plumbers, gas installers, maintenance workers, contract supervisors, and industrial facility managers.

Mr. Holmstrom said, “The CSB has examined several other similar accidents in which gas was purged indoors and not detected. We have determined that workers cannot rely on their sense of smell to warn them of danger, in part because people become desensitized to the odorant added to natural gas and propane. Gas detectors must be used.”

Other incidents examined by the CSB include: a 1999 explosion at a Ford power plant in Dearborn, Michigan, killing six, injuring 38, and causing a $1 billion property loss; a 2008 explosion at a Hilton Hotel under construction in San Diego, California that injured fourteen people; a 2005 school explosion in Porterville, California, burning two plumbers; and an explosion at a hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2007 severely burning two plumbers.

In addition to Chairman Bresland, the board consists of William E. Wright and William B. Wark. There are currently two board vacancies. Approval of recommendations requires a majority vote. The CSB meeting will be held at the Sheraton Raleigh Hotel, 421 South Salisbury Street.

Following a presentation of preliminary findings by the investigation team, the board will receive the views from a panel of experts: Chris Noles of the North Carolina State Fire Marshal’s Office (the state has passed strict regulations to require outdoor gas purging since the accident), Ted Lemoff of the National Fire Protection Association, and Belinda Thielen of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, which represents employees at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant.

Finally, the board will hear from members of the public who wish to speak. “This was a devastating accident,” Chairman Bresland said, “and it is my hope that workers and residents in the area will let us know their views on the need for the stricter codes that we will be considering on Thursday evening.”

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Phosgene leak at DuPont facility leads to temporary closure

By Sam | Jan 26, 2010

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Jan25, 2010- The latest in a string of accidents and safety issues at DuPont’s Belle, W.Va facility was a phosgene leak that resulted in a fatal accident. A braided steel hose connected to a phosgene tank suddenly ruptured, releasing phosgene into the air rsulting in one fatality. Phosgene is one of the deadliest chemicals ever and special precautions are necessary for its handling.

Prior to this latest incident were two other accidents at the same plant. One was an ongoing release of chloromethane from the plant’s Hexazinone unit, which went undetected for several days, and a release of sulfur dioxide from a spent sulfuric acid unit. Following this series of unfortunate events the management has closed down the facility entirely, giving “safety checks” as the reason behind the closure.

Meanwhile the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has taken a dim view of these events and announced an investigation. Speaking for the three-member board, Member William E. Wright said: “The Board is concerned by these releases, which had tragic consequences, and will proceed with an investigation to understand why these unfortunate events occurred.” Mr. Wright cautioned that the new case would likely delay efforts to complete other investigations that are being conducted by same investigative team, including those at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia, and an Ohio environmental services company. Including DuPont, the CSB has 17 open investigations, the largest number in its 11-year history.

In voting to approve the investigation, the Board noted that the CSB was aware of six other releases from the plant since December 2006. The DuPont Belle complex is a large facility that is regulated under the EPA Risk Management Program and the OSHA Process Safety Management standard because of the volume and hazards of the materials it handles and the potential risk to workers and the community.

CSB investigator Johnnie Banks will lead the four-member team which is expected at the site on Tuesday.