Category: General
CSB releases report on power plant safety violations after Kleen energy explosion
Pipe Cleaning Practices that Led to Kleen Energy Explosion Are Common Across Gas Energy Industry, Survey Data Show
CSB Public Meeting Planned Next Month in Connecticut to Consider New Safety Recommendations
Washington, DC, May 19, 2010 – The practice of using flammable natural gas to clean power plant piping, which led to the fatal explosion at Connecticut-based Kleen Energy on February 7, has been commonly used across the gas-fired power generating industry, CSB investigators said today.
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The explosion, which killed six workers and injured at least 50 others, occurred during a “gas blow” – a plannedExample of a gas blow. Note: this photo was not taken at Kleen Energy effort to clean out new fuel-gas piping leading to combustion turbines by directing high-pressure natural gas through the pipes and out of vents located near ground level, adjacent to the power generation building. The gas accumulated above the lower explosive limit and ignited, causing massive damage to the new billion-dollar facility, which was nearing completion.
The ignition source for the blast has not been determined. CSB investigators said the construction site had many possible ignition sources, and that gas blows could also self-ignite if debris ejected from piping impacted other objects nearby, creating sparks – adding to the risk of the practice.
The plant was designed to use a “combined cycle” to efficiently generate electricity. In this type of facility, natural gas is combusted to drive massive turbines, and then residual heat is recovered from the exhaust gases to produce additional power through the use of steam turbines. Newly constructed pipes frequently have debris and other contaminants that can damage gas turbine blades, necessitating some form of pipe cleaning prior to start-up.
CSB investigators will present the new findings, derived from a survey of 62 representatives from the combined-cycle gas power industry, at professional society meetings in Maryland and Connecticut this week. Thirty-nine survey respondents (63%) indicated their companies had at some time used flammable natural gas to blow out piping. Only one of those 39 respondents said a flare was used to safely combust the gas prior to venting to the atmosphere.
According to the survey, using natural gas to clean pipes remains the most common single practice in industry, employed by 37% of respondents. The other respondents reported using nitrogen, which is nonflammable, or inherently safer alternatives such as air, steam, or cleaning pigs. On February 25, 2010, eighteen days after the explosion at Kleen Energy, the CSB stated that natural gas blows were “inherently unsafe” and urged industry to seek alternatives.
“The industry survey confirms that there are readily available safe alternatives to using flammable natural gas for pipe cleaning,” said CSB Investigator Dan Tillema, P.E. “At the same time, a disturbing number of companies continue to use natural gas which creates the serious risk of a fire or explosion.”
“Venting any significant amount of natural gas into a workplace is an open invitation to disaster,” said CSB Chairman John Bresland. “With more than 120 new gas power plants slated for completion in the next five years, there is an urgent need to ensure safety during the construction and maintenance of gas piping. The CSB will be considering recommendations to promote safer practices in industries that use natural gas as fuel.”
In February 2010, the CSB issued urgent safety recommendations to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to prohibit indoor venting of natural gas during purging operations within the national fuel gas code, known as NFPA 54. However, the explosion at Kleen Energy occurred during outdoor venting of a massive quantity of gas. Power plants are in any case exempt from the national fuel gas code, which is developed and maintained by nongovernmental consensus committees administered by the NFPA and the American Gas Association, an industry group.
Chairman Bresland said he anticipated the CSB would convene a public hearing in Connecticut in late June to consider further recommendations to prevent accidents involving the planned venting of natural gas at workplaces.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.
What is WHMIS and why should I bother?
Jan 25, 2010 – Here’s a quick heads up for those of you who are wondering about an acronym called WHMIS (sounds very close to “whims”, doesn’t it). Well for those of you who are not familiar with Canadian law (not expected anyway, unless you live or work in a Canadian facility), WHMIS is the acronym for Workplace Hazard Materials Information System. It is a comprehensive plan for providing information on the safe use of hazardous materials used in Canadian workplaces. Information is provided by means of product labels, material safety data sheets (MSDS) and worker education programs.
It is a legal requirement if you are running a factory or doing other business related to the chemical industry in Canada, formulated and enforced by Canada’s own OSHA-like body, called CCOHS (Canadian Center for Occupational Health and Safety).
The majority of the “information” requirements (and exemptions) of WHMIS legislation were incorporated into the HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS ACT and the HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INFORMATION REVIEW ACT. These apply to all of Canada.
Suppliers, employers and workers all have different specific responsibilities under these acts. For more information please visit http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/intro_whmis.html
So if you are in anyway connected with the Canadian chemicals or petrochemical and allied industries, dealing in controlled chemicals, you better be familiar with WHMIS.
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OSHA cites Murphy Oil facility in Mereaux for alleged Health & Safety violations
MERAUX, La. — The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has cited Murphy Oil U.S.A. Inc. with alleged serious violations of federal health and safety regulations following an inspection at the company’s facility on East St. Bernard Highway in Meraux. Proposed penalties total $85,500.
OSHA’s Baton Rouge Area Office began its investigation July 7 as part of OSHA’s National Emphasis Program (NEP) for Petroleum Refineries.
The investigation resulted in 18 serious violations, including failing to provide an adequate relief system design to prevent possible fire and explosions for the Hydro Cracker unit, to ensure that equipment in the refining process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, to sufficiently develop and implement a written mechanical integrity program, to conduct regularly scheduled piping inspections, and to report findings and recommendations from incident investigations.
A serious violation is one in which there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known.
“In order to protect workers from potential hazards at high risk facilities, OSHA’s process safety management regulations must be followed,” said Dorinda Folse, OSHA’s area director in Baton Rouge, La. “We are hopeful that this company will take the necessary corrective action to prevent injuries and illnesses.”
For more information please visit the OSHA website at http://www.osha.gov
Channel Tunnel electrical failure-weather blamed as possible cause
Sun, Dec 20, 2009- Today’s industrial safety incident is not really “industrial” but serves as a good case study for doing HAZOP and other scenario analyses in industries.
In what has been termed the biggest failure of the electrical systems in a major facility like the England-France channel tunnel (chunnel for short), bad weather is being blamed. However the explanation offered is not very convincing. It seems when the Eurostar trains left a cold France and entered the warmer chunnel, going towards England, moisture condensation kocked out several electrical systems in the trains, leading to complete breakdown.
The reason given seems hardly believable, especially to us who have spent years in factories and industries that run electrical equipment in hot or cold weather 24/7 all around the year. It is difficult for even a gullible lay person to accept this as a valid reason. Are the authorities hiding something? If it is a case of bad engineering design or maintenance, only an independent enquiry will reveal. Overall it is just a sad symptom of how little attention is paid nowadays to good engineering amd maintenance all over the world in recent years.
Meanwhile the public at large continues to suffer as seen below.
BP fined $87 million over Texas refinery safety issues by OSHA
Oct-30, 2009 Washington- The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) today announced it is issuing $87,430,000 in proposed penalties to BP Products North America Inc. for the company’s failure to correct potential hazards faced by employees. The fine is the largest in OSHA’s history. The prior largest total penalty, $21 million, was issued in 2005, also against BP.
Safety violations at BP’s Texas City, Texas, refinery resulted in a massive explosion — with 15 deaths and 170 people injured – in March of 2005. BP entered into a settlement agreement with OSHA in September of that year, under which the company agreed to corrective actions to eliminate potential hazards similar to those that caused the 2005 tragedy. Today’s announcement comes at the conclusion of a six-month inspection by OSHA, designed to evaluate the extent to which BP has complied with its obligations under the 2005 agreement and OSHA standards.
“When BP signed the OSHA settlement from the March 2005 explosion, it agreed to take comprehensive action to protect employees. Instead of living up to that commitment, BP has allowed hundreds of potential hazards to continue unabated,” said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. “Fifteen people lost their lives as a result of the 2005 tragedy, and 170 others were injured. An $87 million fine won’t restore those lives, but we can’t let this happen again. Workplace safety is more than a slogan. It’s the law. The U.S. Department of Labor will not tolerate the preventable exposure of workers to hazardous conditions.”
For noncompliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, the BP Texas City Refinery has been issued 270 “notifications of failure to abate” with fines totaling $56.7 million. Each notification represents a penalty of $7,000 times 30 days, the period that the conditions have remained unabated. OSHA also identified 439 new willful violations for failures to follow industry-accepted controls on the pressure relief safety systems and other process safety management violations with penalties totaling $30.7 million.
“BP was given four years to correct the safety issues identified pursuant to the settlement agreement, yet OSHA has found hundreds of violations of the agreement and hundreds of new violations. BP still has a great deal of work to do to assure the safety and health of the employees who work at this refinery,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA Jordan Barab.
The BP Texas City Refinery is the third largest refinery in the United States with a refining capacity of 475,000 barrels of crude per day. It is located on a 1,200-acre facility in Texas City, southeast of Houston in Galveston County.
Will this large fine serve up a wakeup call to company managements regarding the importance of following safety guidelines and good engineering practices? Only time will tell….
