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RSSCategory: General

CSB says employees should be part of accident investigations to promote facility safety

| March 18, 2012 | 0 Comments
Washington, DC, March 7, 2012 — The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) announced today that it has developed a new policy on employee participation in investigations that the Board hopes will enhance the vital role played by plant workers in determining root causes of incidents and promoting facility safety. The policy, which was approved by a unanimous 3-0 vote of the Board on February 27, follows a roundtable involving accident victims, family members, and worker representatives the CSB convened in 2011.
The new policy implements a key provision of the CSB enabling statute at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(L), which provides that employees and their representatives have similar rights in CSB accident investigations as they do during OSHA inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
CSB Chairperson Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “The new employee participation guidance is an important milestone for the CSB, as we continue to strengthen our investigative processes. The CSB has already been following a number of the elements of the policy in past and ongoing investigations, but the new policy will assure uniformity and increased employee participation at sites across the country.”
The ten key elements of the new policy include:
(1)          If the CSB initiates an investigation at a union-represented site, the CSB will promptly identify and notify facility unions of its plans to investigate. At non-union sites, the CSB will seek to identify other employee representatives, such as employee members of any established Health and Safety Committee, or other employee representatives, if possible.
(2)          The CSB will seek participation by contract employees and their representatives, similar to facility employees.
(3)          The CSB will establish direct, face-to-face communications with employee representatives from the outset of its investigations.
(4)          The CSB will take measures to avoid interference by any party with the proper exercise of employee participation.
(5)          CSB investigators will allow and encourage employee representatives to accompany the CSB team during site inspections and tours. Such participation is often critical for understanding complex processes and learning of important safety concerns and hazards.
(6)          Where necessary to obtain information, CSB investigators will conduct separate meetings with employee representatives.
(7)          During CSB interviews, any non-supervisory employee may be accompanied by another non-supervisory employee, a personal attorney, or a family member as described in 40 CFR 1610.
(8)          The CSB will provide employee representatives with the opportunity to review and comment upon evidence and equipment testing protocols and to observe testing, similar to the opportunities for companies and other parties. Employee representatives will also have access to any test results, to an extent equivalent to other parties.
(9)          The CSB will provide employee representatives with the opportunity to review and comment on the factual accuracy of CSB reports, recommendations, and interim statements of findings prior to public release, to a degree equivalent to any opportunities provided to company representatives.
(10)      The CSB will monitor the implementation of the policy to ensure that participation by facility employees and representatives in CSB investigations does not result in prohibited whistleblower retaliation under 42 USC § 7622. Documented instances of retaliation will be referred to appropriate federal enforcement agencies.
“Over the next few months, the CSB plans to develop a brochure for employees as well as a new web page summarizing the new policy,” Dr. Moure-Eraso said. “Our goal is effective employee participation from the first day of an investigation right through to our final report.  No one knows more about the day-to-day operations at a plant than the workers who go there every day in the hope of safely earning a living.  We cannot fully succeed in our mission without their help.”

Radiation Rain message fake says BBC in statement

| March 15, 2011 | 0 Comments

March 15, 2011 - As a consequence of the Japan nuclear power plant reactor accidents,  rumor mongers and hoax message senders are having a great time. The latest one is a purported text message / email from BBC, warning about radioactive rain in Asia. The reader is warned not to venture out in rain as the Japanese nuclear plant radiation leaks have apparently spread outside Japan and are spreading to the rest of Asia alongwith rain. The statement is false, says the BBC and deny that they ever published or said anything like this.

Here is the link to the BBC statement.

Additionally the statement also includes a release from the US-CERT (Computer Emergency Readiness Team) which tells computer users to be wary of potential e-mail scams, as well as fake anti-virus and phishing attacks regarding the Japan earthquake and the tsunami disasters.

So if you have got such a message on your cellphone or got it via email, you can breathe easy for now as it is supposed to be fake. This message seems to have caused quite a flutter in the Philippines, where the government has now issued an official denial regarding any such event.

Conclusion: Rumors spread faster than tsunamis and radiation!

HAZOP Study- A primer for technical professionals

| January 29, 2011 | 0 Comments

Miami, Jan 29, 2011 – This article will present some information about HAZOP (acronym that stands for Hazard and Operability Study) that is used in process plants such as Oil and Gas facilities, chemical plants, power plants and similar installations,  to assess the safety aspects of the plant and related facilities.

If you would like a more detailed coverage and training related to HAZOP, you can download the HAZOP Training Course from here.

HAZOP is a technique that started out circa 1960s as “efficiency” studies in ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) in the UK. At that time it was the rage to do efficiency and productivity studies on various operations in different kinds of industries (it was the golden era of Industrial Engineering) and some bright spark decided to try it out on a spanking new design of a phenol plant was on the design board.

Well, he opened a can of worms, as it were, because the efficiency improvement study found several holes in operational safety as well and the technique of HAZOP was born. Inititally it was confined only to ICIs internal departments, but later on it spread via conferences and papers to other companies as well and soon became an established safety technique.

The Bhopal incident that happened two decades later was a wake up call to the global chemicals and process industries and HAZOP began to be used not only for new plants at the design stage but also for older plants, modifications, shutdowns and turnarounds and so on. The process not only improved Safety but also operational ease.

In the typical HAZOP methodology, a plant or a subsystem of the plant (called a node) is chosen for study. Then all deviations are studied against the original intentions and permutations and combinations give rise to possibilities that can result in accidents. These are then assessed to modify the design or the workflow,  so that the process becomes safer. Of course there is much more to this and it requires training in the technique plus a few real life HAZOP studies to really master the technique.

Today one cannot think of not using HAZOP in a process plant, it has become ubiquitous. However being subjective, the result of the HAZOP study depends greatly on the people that comprise the team carrying it out and a bad HAZOP from a bad team results in the plant being even more unsafe than had there been no HAZOP at all! As we always say, incompetence is worse than malfeasance, because malicious people will behave in certain predictable ways, but incompetent people can be incompetent and stupid in several ways that can never be thought of by the rest of humanity. So it is very important that only trained and competent people are in charge of HAZOPs.

CSB Board Member Mark Griffon Calls on American Society of Mechanical Engineers to Adopt CSB Recommendation Prohibiting Natural Gas Blows at Power Plants

| September 22, 2010 | 0 Comments

Phoenix, Arizona, September 21, 2010—U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Member Mark Griffon today called on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) to adopt a CSB recommendation calling for natural gas blows to be prohibited during power plant construction.

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The recommendation was one of 18 urgent recommendations issued in June 2010 following a CSB investigation into a powerful natural gas explosion that killed six workers and injured dozens of others at the Kleen Energy plant in Middletown, Connecticut on February 7, 2010, which was under construction. Workers used hundreds of thousands of cubic feet of natural gas to clean debris from gas pipes used to fuel electricity-producing turbines. The gas accumulated in and around the buildings, was ignited by an unknown ignition source, and exploded.

Speaking to a meeting of ASME members in Phoenix who are considering changes to the ASME Code for Pressure Piping Systems, Mr. Griffon said, “The CSB believes that using natural gas or other flammable gases to clean fuel gas piping is inherently unsafe and should be prohibited.”  He cited other accidents to show that explosions resulting from flammable gas blows have the potential of causing death, serious injuries, and costly property damage.

Mr. Griffon noted that the practice of using gas blows, or forcing large volumes of flammable gas through piping to clear out debris, was common in construction of electric generating facilities. The CSB investigation of Kleen Energy, resulting in 18 urgent recommendations, states “From a fire and explosion perspective, releasing large volumes of natural gas in the vicinity of workers or ignition sources is inherently unsafe.”

In remarks prepared for the ASME, which is considering the CSB recommendation to prohibit gas blows and use inherently safer methodologies to clean piping, Board Member Griffon said, “It has been argued that the gas blow at Kleen Energy was not conducted properly to ensure the dispersion of the released natural gas and to prevent the gas from encountering ignition sources. This point overlooks the simple fact that cleaning piping with flammable gases presents an inherent explosion hazard. Cleaning piping with flammable gases presents an explosion hazard that cannot be wholly eliminated.”

Even if every effort is made to eliminate ignition sources, such as welding, or electrical equipment not rated for a hazardous environment, he noted, the friction of the gas flowing through the piping can cause an accumulation of static electricity and cause ignition; in addition, sparks from impacts of metal debris striking surfaces when the gas exits the piping can also ignite the gas.

Mr. Griffon noted the CSB investigation found ample alternatives to gas blows which are safer. These methods include blowing air or nitrogen through piping, or by “pigging,” in which a cleaning device is propelled through the pipe using air.

Board Member Griffon noted that that some in industry have already eliminated gas blows. He said that a representative of General Electric, a major gas turbine manufacturer,  stated at the CSB public meeting in June that his company greatly discourages gas blows and did not know of any situation where using gas to clean pipes was necessary. The company official said GE wants to “make gas blows something that will not happen again under GE’s watch.” GE also expressly prohibits its own employees from being on site if one of its customers chooses to conduct a blow with natural gas.

Since the public meeting, several other major turbine manufacturers also have reported to the CSB that they already have, or intend to soon develop, guidance that strongly advises their clients away from the practice of natural gas blows.

CSB gets a new Chairman Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso-former Chairman John Bresland to continue as board member

| June 26, 2010 | 0 Comments

June 25, 2010-Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso has been confirmed as the new Chairman of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. Former Chairman Mr. John Bresland will continue on the board as a member until he completes his five year term. Additionally, Mr. Mark Griffon has been also appointed to the board as a member.

A part of the statement from the CSB is given below:

Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso Confirmed and Appointed as New Chairman and Mark Griffon as Board Member of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010 – Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso has been confirmed and appointed as the new chairman of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), the agency announced today; Mr. Mark Griffon has been appointed as a new board member, filling the other vacancy on the Board.

The new chairman and board member were nominated by President Obama on March 22, 2010. They were discharged from the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on June 17 and confirmed by the full Senate on June 23. They were appointed and commissioned by the president the following day.

Outgoing Chairman John Bresland said, “I greatly look forward to working with the new appointees; their diverse backgrounds and deep dedication to workplace safety will serve as an invaluable resource for the board as we enter a time of profound challenge and opportunity.”

Mr. Bresland has now stepped down from the chairman position but will continue to serve as a board member for the remainder of his five-year term, which runs through March 2013.

Dr. Moure-Eraso has until now served as Chair and Head of the Department of Work Environment, School of Health and Environment, University of Massachusetts, Lowell. He has 30 years of experience in workplace safety issues and is a certified industrial hygienist. He received a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from the University of Pittsburgh and a master’s degree in chemical engineering from Bucknell University. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati in Environmental Health-Industrial Hygiene.

Mr. Griffon has been working as a consultant in the environmental and occupational health field for 18 years. Mr. Mark Griffon is also a member of the Federal Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness and Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA). Mr. Griffon holds a B.S. in Chemistry from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and an M.S. in Radiological Sciences from University of Massachusetts.

Both new appointees will participate in the CSB’s upcoming public meeting to release urgent recommendations from the Kleen Energy investigation on Monday, June 28, 2010, at 6:30 pm in Portland, Connecticut. Dr. Moure will preside at the meeting.

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